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ABSTRACT
The pervasive availability and increasingly sophisticated functionalities of smartphones and
their connected external sensors or wearable devices can provide new data collection capa-
bilities relevant to public health. Current research and commercial efforts have concentrated
on sensor-based collection of health data for personal fitness and personal healthcare feed-
back purposes. However, to date there has not been a detailed investigation of how such
smartphones and sensors can be utilized for public health data collection purposes.
Unlike most sensing applications, in the case of public health, capturing comprehensive
and detailed data is not a necessity, as aggregate data alone is in many cases sufficient for
public health purposes. As such, public health data has the characteristic of being capturable
whilst still not infringing privacy, as the full detailed data of individuals that may allow re-
identification is not needed, but rather only aggregate, de-identified and non-unique data for
an individual. For example, rather than details of the physical activity such as specific route,
just total caloric burn over a week or month could be submitted, which is much less unique
and thereby not identifying the individual.
These types of public health data collection provide the challenge of the need to be
flexible enough to answer a range of public health queries, while ensuring the level of detail
returned preserves privacy. Additionally, the distribution of public health data collection
request and other information to the participants without identifying the individual is a core
requirement, with a additional need for any approach to be extremely scalable to population
levels.
xAn additional requirement for health participatory sensing networks is the ability to
perform public health interventions. In line with the requirements above, this needs to be
completed in a non-identifying and privacy preserving manner.
This thesis proposes a solution to these challenges, whereby a form of query assurance is
used to provide private and secure distribution of data collection requests and public health
interventions to the participants. While an additional, privacy preserving threshold approach
to local processing of data prior to submission is used to provide re-identification protection
for the participant.
In brief. this thesis summarizes the related research, introduces, prototypes and evaluates
a new type of public health information system to provide aggregate population health data
capture and public health informational or behavioral intervention capabilities via utilizing
smartphone and sensor capabilities, whilst maintaining the anonymity and privacy of each
individual.
In particular the key aspects of privacy, anonymity and intervention capabilities of these
emerging systems are considered and a detailed evaluation of anonymity preservation char-
acteristics is carried out.
The evaluation finds that with manageable overheads, minimal reduction in the detail of
collected data and strict communication privacy; privacy and anonymity can be preserved.
This is significant for the field of participatory health sensing as a major concern of partic-
ipants is most often real or perceived privacy risks of contribution. Furthermore, for such
a system to meet its potential a large user base is required, so the reduction of participant
concerns is paramount to the system’s success.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The recent rapid growth in both the capabilities and uptake of mobile devices suitable to
act as health sensor platforms has the potential to advance public health data collection
and intervention in significant ways. However, increasingly research and development is
concentrating on how mobile devices and sensors can be used as a tool for individual health
data capture and feedback. Indeed, most of the major device manufacturers now ship devices
with at least basic health monitoring capability as a stock application [1, 2, 3]. However, this
advancement has not been extended into an investigation or implementation of how these
devices can be used for public health data capture purposes.
The potential for useful public health data collection is quite extensive. Even with typical
on-board or currently available external sensors, there are real possibilities of augmenting or
replacing traditional public health data collection methodologies. Additionally, the collec-
tion of data from mobile devices is likely to be the only practical way to assess the detailed
benefit or effectiveness of mobile device health/fitness applications to improve individual
and public health.
The challenges for collection of participatory sensing public health data are varied, but
the foremost would be privacy and security, especially as such a system will potentially
be collecting sensitive health-related data. Interestingly, the case for public health usage
does not require the same level of precise data that would often be required in participatory
sensing applications [4] in other domains. For example, the exact location and time of a
measured sensor value is less important than the aggregate value over a period of time or
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the trend or change for an individual or community as a whole. These privacy and security
requirements typically are represented by two groups:
• Privacy of the individual
• Security of the device, communication and data collection server.
An additional challenge is the likelihood of such a system being a multiple data-owner
system, where there are many public health groups/organizations interacting with a single
health participatory sensing network (HPSN). Though this increases complexity, it is the
only practical way to implement a health participatory sensing system as other approaches
are likely to fracture the participants into separate platforms, creating smaller, and perhaps,
not as representative participant groups.
As well as the data collection capability, the second key capability would be its usage
as a platform for dissemination of public health interventions. This would typically take the
form of informational/behavioral adjustment communication [5]. Potentially, such a HPSN
would allow for more targeted and personalized public health interventions and the ability
to track the effectiveness through the data collection capabilities to allow for analysis and
improvement of intervention approaches.
The thesis as a whole aims to propose a solution to the challenges of privacy and security
within a multi-owner HPSN, capable of distributing public health interventions. This will
require a definition and categorization of the types of HPSNs and the overall necessary capa-
bilities and functionality of such systems. Additionally, implementation details addressing
the challenges defined above that were not suitably covered in the prior literature will be
investigated, designed and evaluated.
1.1 Synopsis of the Thesis 5
1.1 Synopsis of the Thesis
Chapter 2 will provide an overall literature review of health-related mobile sensors, explor-
ing the new and developing potential of HPSN and similar networks. Additionally, this
section will cover incentivization of participatory sensing. In the health specific context
there is limited relevant participatory sensing research, so more broad considerations of in-
centivization of other types of participatory sensing are reviewed and their relevance to the
context discussed. Finally, the privacy and security section details approaches proposed in
prior work to both provide data consistency at low levels of overhead (query assurance), and
anonymity to participants that submit either observational or personal data.
Chapter 3 will provide an overview of the entire HPSN system, discussing from a high
level the necessary components, interaction models, security and privacy methods that com-
prise this approach. This chapter serves as a broad solution chapter, bringing together all the
related components of the system within an overall reference architecture. The following
chapters will often refer back to this foundation work and go into further technical imple-
mentation and evaluation details.
Chapter 4 will be the first implementation/evaluation chapter focusing on the concepts,
methodology, implementation and evaluation of the secure distribution approach proposed
to be utilized by the HPSN. This will involve building a prototype system with example data
and evaluating the efficiency of this approach. Within the overall HPSN approach this chap-
ter provides a detailed solution description of an authenticated query assurance approach to
the distribution of large amounts of disparate and multi-owner data. This supports the over-
all HPSN approach by providing an efficient approach to distributing data through untrusted
third-parties as would be required when avoiding identification of HPSN participants. The
chapter sets out to describe and evaluate a system for public health data collection rule dis-
tribution that can ensure the correctness, completeness and freshness of the data distributed
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to HPSN participants without incurring overheads that would significantly increase the cost
of participation.
Chapter 5 will be the second implementation/evaluation chapter focusing on the con-
cepts, methodology, implementation and evaluation of the secure de-identification approach
proposed to be utilized by the HPSN. Due to the nature of health related data, simple de-
identification of records is insufficient. This is due to the risk of re-identification of records
based on analysis or inference. As such, an anonymizing approach is proposed which pro-
vides additional protection against re-identification with a prototype with example data de-
veloped, implemented and evaluated in this chapter. Within the overall scope of the solution
this chapter serves as a detailed solution to the requirement to keep the data collected by the
system on individuals within the system at a level of detail that would make re-identification
of a participant based on those details highly unlikely. Due to the nature of this type of prob-
lem a probabilistic approach is taken whereby we consider the overall levels of k-anonymity
protection within the system as our method for evaluation. The scope of this problem is to
ensure that the system is not able to re-identify an individual to learn sensitive details based
on less sensitive details that could be obtained externally to the system. Additionally, it is
required that the system does not allow for re-identification and hence learning of sensitive
details based on externally sensitive details of the individual that may be already known to
a privileged user of a non-public system.
Chapter 6 constitutes the final chapter of the implementation/evaluation sections. This
chapter will provide additional implementation detail and evaluation of the public health
intervention approach. This final chapter deals specifically with the distribution, application
and reporting collection of the use of public health interventions (rather than data collection)
within a health participatory sensing network. Though these topics were touched on briefly
in chapters 4 and 5, they are covered in greater detail in this section with an appropriate
prototype implementation and results.
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Chapter 7 is the discussion and future work chapter that reviews the thesis content and
provides further context of the thesis contribution.
Chapter 8 is the conclusion, providing a summary and potential direction for future work
or developments.
Appendix A provides additional implementation details of the query assurance, se-
cure de-identification and public health intervention methodologies/implementations such
as pseudo-code samples used for implementation.

2 RELATED WORK
2.1 Introduction
In recent years technology and new communications models have begun to be utilized for
public health. Though the possibilities involving information collection through mobile or
other Internet connected devices, including both traditional survey-based approaches as well
as more innovative crowd-sourcing or participatory sensing [1] approaches are just begin-
ning to be explored. Additionally, information dissemination approaches will allow public
health authorities to communicate relevant health messages to the community. However,
there are some significant differences in the detail, between approaches that use technology
to improve current methodologies and those that are exploring entirely new opportunities -
such as targeted communication and sensor data collection.
Additionally, the incentivization for participation in public health approaches/campaigns
varies with distinct techniques used with different technologies. The most common ap-
proaches include rewards (monetary or non-monetary) [2, 3], gamification [4], altruistic
and personal benefit [5, 6, 7].
Lastly, the area of participatory public health often raises issues of privacy and data se-
curity for the individuals taking part. Some technologies have parallels to traditional public
health data collection and communication. However, increasingly the types of data and the
real-time or near real-time nature of collection require more advanced privacy protections.
As such, privacy protection in participatory sensing has numerous approaches/techniques
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ranging from de-identification [8] to personal data vaults [9] and distributed anonymization
techniques [10].
This chapter will firstly briefly summarize participatory sensing which is the focus of
this thesis. Following that, the current and ever expanding sensor capabilities for health
participatory sensing networks will be discussed in detail. Next, research relevant to in-
centivization of participation in human-centric sensing [11] systems such as HPSNs will be
discussed and presented. Lastly, the literature related to privacy and security protections for
participatory sensing will be summarized.
2.2 Participatory Sensing Systems for Public Health
Increasingly, technology and especially smartphones serving as mobile sensing platforms
have been creating data that is relevant to public health. Known as human-centric sens-
ing [11] (HCS) or participatory sensing, these approaches allow for the collection of highly
relevant data both through sensing of the surroundings and sensing of the individual. This
trend is relevant to recent research suggesting one in four adults track their health informa-
tion online [12].
A key driver of the capabilities of participatory sensing systems for public health will
always be the sensing capabilities available to these networks. In the rest of this section the
common types of sensors that are relevant to public health, either existing or currently in
development will be summarized.
2.2.1 Sensor Capabilities
The proliferation of commercial fitness and health sensors provides new mechanisms for
population health data capture, even though these are currently targeted for use in relation
to an individual’s health and fitness. Commercially available sensors are also already able
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to capture many biomedical measures collected in public health data surveys. Such sensors
include wearable patches, stretchable electronic tattoos, smartwatches, other wearables and
implantable sensors along with the more widely deployed smartphones and connected sen-
sors. In addition, such public health data capture would have a number of characteristics
quite distinct from traditional survey-based public health data capture approaches. These
include:
• Being real-time/ near real-time
• Larger participant numbers/ proportion of population
• More detailed data
• Captured electronically
• Direct measurement, not human response
• Anonymized collection
The area of personal health sensor and software development and commercialization [13]
is currently a highly active area. This is possibly due to the relevance of these individual sen-
sors to both the rapidly developing smartphone market and technologies, and the increasing
interest to leverage such technologies for personal wellness, fitness, health and healthcare
purposes [14, 15].
Fitness and Physical Activity Sensors
Commercial implementations such as Fitbit [16] and Jawbone Up [17] demonstrate the po-
tential for and achievability of continuous physical activity sensing. Jawbone Up extends
beyond physical activity monitoring to include sleep patterns and sleep quality, and a nu-
tritional diary. Other well-known examples of such wearable sensors include RunKeeper,
myFitnessPal, Pebble Watch and the Basis Watch. Such fitness and health sensors are the
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most contemporarily available type of sensor that can be utilized for public health purposes,
because such sensors are already achieving widespread interest and a level of mass adoption.
Also of significant relevance is Google Now’s Activity Summary [18] which automatically
provides a monthly estimate of how far an individual has walked and cycled, and comes
as part of Google’s Android mobile operating system – hence is already extremely widely
deployed. A more recent development has been the introduction of Google Fit [19] which
extends on the automatic tracking of Google Now’s Activity Summary and adds goals, hard-
ware/application integration and daily tracking. Apple’s Health and HealthKit [20] are also
targeting this area for the iOS platform, as are independent manufacturers such as Samsungs
S Health [21]
Vital Signs Sensors
Smartwatches such as the Mio Active are able to capture heart rate; the Amiigo wristband
captures blood oxygen levels; Somaxis provides ECG and EMG sensors; and the mc10
stretchable electronic tattoo can transmit heart rate and brain activity [13]. In general the
use of sweat-based sensors / temporary tattoos [22] is currently of great interest, with po-
tential uses from managing cystic fibrosis to monitoring physical exertion, hydration and
performance [23]. Another example, the Sense A/S monitoring patch is able to measure
blood pressure [13]. The capturing of vital signs is often beneficial for individual health
care, but it also adds new capabilities for public health data systems. The greatest shift in
uptake so far has been in heart rate monitors, with the technical advancements of affordable
optical heart rate monitors, meaning that chest strap monitors are no longer required. The
shift has provided a large variety of wrist and arm band sensors at consumer or sport grade
level as well as less traditional approaches such as heartphones [24] available commercially
as iRiver Heart rate headphones [25].
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Blood Constituent Sensors
Increasingly, there are wireless-enabled patch technologies emerging that may be able to
capture the levels of some blood constituents. Examples include the forthcoming Sano In-
telligence [26] wearable patch which is touted to allow the capture of blood glucose and
potassium levels, with further blood constituent capture planned for the future. Numerous
continuous blood glucose monitoring systems are also currently available, particularly of
relevance to the management of diabetes. Such sensor capabilities in a cheap and accurate
form have the potential to revolutionize individual health care, early detection and preven-
tative health; and by extension, also public health. Because such capabilities may be so
beneficial in terms of individual health monitoring, health maintenance and early detection,
they could achieve wide adoption. If so, their possible role in public health data capture can
also be proportionately significant.
Ambient sensors
Other initiatives such as Riderlog [27] and the Copenhagen Wheel [28] are moving towards
capturing physical activity levels and at the same time, additional contextual and environ-
mental data. The Copenhagen Wheel goes beyond physical activity sensing, to urban en-
vironment monitoring with air quality and noise sensors included in the implementation to
provide additional data beyond just the activity of the individual.
Sleep monitors
Sleep monitors/sensors are becoming commonly available and use a variety of techniques
to track sleep length and/or quality. The primary techniques are actigraphy-based systems
such as Actiwatch [29], Fitbit [16] and Jawbone [17], among many others. Other techniques
utilize radio-frequency biomotion sensors such as SleepMinder [30] and Sleep Design [31].
The accuracy of such sleep sensors and their applicability outside the average population is
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often raised in research [32] as well as the comparative strengths of actigraphy compared
to radio-frequency approaches [31]. However, overall there has been a great increase in the
accessibility and quality of sleep sensors.
Summary
Recent years have produced an explosion of consumer grade sensors and sensor platforms
allowing individuals to quantify ever larger portions of their lives. The capabilities and ac-
curacy of these sensors are ever evolving and represent a myriad of possibilities for public
health usage. Where currently, very little of this already extant information is available for
public health usage, it is foreseeable that this could change especially with the develop-
ment/implementation of built for purpose HPSNs.
2.2.2 Motivation and Incentivization
Participatory sensing due to its decentralized collection methodology and opt-in participa-
tion often needs to consider the motivation and incentivization of participants. The reality
of these platforms is their reliance on good quality and representative data collection, with-
out which the value of the analysis and conclusions of any such data collection would be
affected. As such, motivation and incentivization techniques are often a key component of
participatory sensing design and research [33, 2, 34]. Additionally, any incentivization ap-
proach would need to take into account potential negative impacts [35] from participation;
and provide adequate compensation. There are two main goals of incentivization and moti-
vation for all participatory sensing networks and an additional goal for health participatory
sensing, these are:
1. Increase the participation rate in a sensing network [33]. This meets the need of
involving a sufficient number of participants to have a meaningful coverage of the
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location/area/demographics the sensing network is collecting data upon. This could
involve rewarding more valuable/rare contributions at different rates.
2. Increase the quality of the data [34], whereby participants who provide better quality
data or do not provide poor quality data are incentivized.
3. Specific to the health domain, incentivization approaches are already common in at-
tempts to improve an individual’s health. So incentivization of health participatory
sensing networks will need to add this to the existing goals listed above.
In this section, the more common incentivization approaches used in participatory sens-
ing with examples of research/commercial applications will be covered in greater detail.
Altruistic
An altruistic system is one that encourages user participation on the basis that participation
is good for society. There is no immediate reward other than the perceived (or perhaps
personally realized) downstream benefits. This type of approach has a long history in other
research methodologies, and is sometimes considered to be equivalent to the practice of ’cit-
izen science’. In the realm of participatory sensing for public health, this is most relevant
to creating a small sample which may or may not be fully representative of the wider com-
munity. Altruistic approaches are often made more attractive through gamification of the
data collection process, such as including statistics or achievements [4], for the individual
to track their personal progress and contribution.
Social Translucence
A system whereby participant’s contributions and/or their associated value to the participa-
tory sensing system are visible to one another [36]. In practice this could be implemented
through a reputation-based approach or through a competitive gamification [4] approach
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amongst other techniques. An example of competitive gamification is the inclusion of
leaderboards or rankings/ranked participants, as in NoiseMap [4]. Another approach uti-
lized in [37], is the use of participant-to-participant feedback-based rankings, where the
individual users of the system endorse each other based on the quality or usefulness of their
contribution.
Personal Benefit
This is an incentivization approach whereby the primary motivation for participation in
the participatory sensing system is the direct (non-financial or reputational) benefits that
a participant can gain. In a health participatory sensing context this would involve things
such as improved health and more relevant health communication. In essence this refers
to the ability to use the individual’s information in concert with the overall collected data
for a population to provide a better service to the health consumer than could be achieved
through stand-alone collection. Overall, personal benefit has been an extremely successful
incentivization approach in recent years, with high quality software/applications regularly
being provided for free to the user, to allow data collection or advertising by the software
creator. Some examples specifically in the participatory sensing field include Waze [5], a
community-based traffic and navigation application, that includes sensor and contributor
data (maps, petrol prices, accidents, road hazards and traffic jams) to improve the quality
and usefulness of the application to the users. Another example of personal benefit is Weath-
erLah [38], a crowd sourced weather application which uses participatory sensing data from
individuals to provide a more detailed rain map. Other possible examples include wait time
applications and public transport applications [6, 7].
The health domain brings a different component to the potential benefit, whereby, par-
ticipation has benefits to the individual’s health, such as Astmapolis [39], a participatory
data collection system for asthma inhalers that users the aggregate data from multiple users
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to help an individual manage their asthma. As such, this would be the primary benefit type
approach of a health participatory sensing application. However, some additional informa-
tional/public contribution benefits have been considered in previous applications such as
Riderlog [27], which as well as collecting cycling information, uses the collected informa-
tion to campaign for better infrastructure. Another alternative benefit for health participatory
sensing applications is the commonly found route sharing or heatmap [40] capabilities that
can be provided, distributing information to participants of the system as to more conve-
nient/better routes/areas to exercise/commute based on popularity.
Market Approaches to Incentivization
This refers to a compensation-based system that pays participants for their contribution.
Such a system may pay users on a pay-per-measurement or pay-per-time or task basis [3].
There has been substantial research around this area such as [34] which utilizes a market
equilibrium monetary incentivization approach to reward quality of contributed service. The
length of potential participation is also of concern, with some prior work focusing on long
term participation [41]. An alternate approach that focuses on minimizing the total cost of
compensating participants through a reverse auction design, has been presented in previous
work [42]. The advantages of this approach are that it motivates users to participate through
incentives, but also provides motivation for truthful cost reporting and hence a more efficient
incentivization approach, than if a monetary (or value reward) approach is to be utilized. The
previous approaches are characteristic of the two different market approaches:
1. Incentivize based on the value of the contribution to the participatory sensing system
2. Incentivize based on the cost of participation to the individual.
In practice, it is likely that both approaches will have different use cases and relevance in
various health participatory sensing systems.
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Most of the previous work on market approaches to incentivization has been limited
to providing a mathematical proof or example data set prototype of its effectiveness. How-
ever, some smaller/pilot studies including participants have been completed [42]. This study
used an incentive approach based on the number and quality of contribution (based on the
market approach proposed in [34]) alongside an endorsement social-cloud, whereby par-
ticipants provide peer-to-peer feedback. The initial results were positive in relation to the
effectiveness of an incentive model. A larger trial involved the use of pedometers and a
reward system, Steptacular [2]. Steptacular was quite a large trial involving over 5000 em-
ployees at Accenture-USA. The project utilized a monetary incentive and a combination of
gamification and social incentives. Their comparative analysis to the 10K Challenge previ-
ously deployed at Accenture-USA indicated that a combination of incentive approaches is
more effective than monetary alone. However, a combination of monetary and gamification,
whereby the monetary amount was randomized/gamified was found to be problematic due
to creating confusion amongst users as to how much money they could actually win.
Mandated
A mandated system is one that requires users to participate. This includes systems in use
by participants as part of their professional duties (e.g. civil service employees and first re-
sponders), private workforce unrelated to their professional duties, or indeed directly from
a government body. Though these approaches would result in a simpler system than one
which needs to be designed to encourage participation, it is foreseeable that this type of ini-
tiative could be potentially controversial. Typically, the literature has not gone into detail as
to a mandated approach, and search of the literature did not find a relevant study/prototype
of this type of approach. However, it is conceivable that it will have similar issues to other
mandatory public data collections, such as censuses, that require participation. One key con-
cern would be of course data quality, and any future consideration of mandated participation
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will have to consider how to detect and handle purposefully inaccurate data contributed by
unwilling participants.
2.3 Privacy and Security in Public Health Participatory
Sensing Systems
Public health participatory sensing systems through their involvement of individuals in the
collection and submission of data inherently pose significant privacy concerns. Firstly, there
are concerns over privacy of the individual within the system. Where the individual is de-
identified in a system it will not be primary concern. However in an identified system, the
questions of who has access and how securely stored the individual’s details are will be
important. Secondly, there is the security and privacy of the collected data. This deals with
access to the data, the sensitivity and how likely it is that the data could be used to re-identify
an individual (if they were de-identified within the system). Lastly, is the concern over
communication privacy between the participant and the system. If the user is unidentified
to the system it must be possible to submit data in a non-identifiable way, as well as keep
the communication secure from a third-party that may attempt to intercept. While in an
approach where the user is to be identifiable by the public health information system, the
former requirement for non-identifiable communication can be excluded.
The rest of this section will introduce and discuss the various privacy and security meth-
ods for participatory sensing networks presented in the prior literature. Approaches specific
to health participatory sensing networks are less common, so where appropriate, the rel-
evance for health data will be considered. The approaches are typically broken into two
subgroups
1. Approaches for trusted servers
2. Approaches for untrusted servers.
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2.3.1 Trusted Servers
The utilization of a trusted server approach reduces the complexity of security and privacy
considerations for a health participatory sensing system by assuming a level of security
at the server level. Therefore, provision of communication security, server security and
encryption are needed to provide protection from the threat of malicious outside attackers or
other security threats (which are similar to any other server holding secure data). However,
there remains the issue of privacy of data once it is being used or distributed.
A conventional approach would be to anonymize any used data to a k-anonymity [8]
or another anonymizing variant [43, 44] level, so as to anonymize the data before it is
accessible for research/analysis. k-anonymity provides an approach whereby, a data set
is considered to be anonymized if an individual record is indistinguishable from k other
records.
Another approach is differential privacy [45, 46] which adds noise to a data set to cre-
ate individual uncertainty while maintaining the integrity of the statistical dataset (that is
the meaningfulness of the statistical data is not lost). This is a well developed approach
to anonymizing datasets for use. Essentially, differential privacy tries to ensure that the re-
moval or addition of any particular record in a dataset does not change the outcome of any
analysis by much. As such, the presence of an individual in the dataset cannot be discerned
and hence exploited through multiple data requests. However, there are some limitations,
such as either needing to know the use of data in advance, limitation in data types or cer-
tain types of sums/counts. Additionally, prior work has discussed that without significant
advancements it is still of limited usefulness for health data [47].
Alternatively, other approaches have taken an additional step by removing some sensi-
tive information before submission (removal of identifiers and communications anonymity)
with a central point of trust [48] to provide an anonymous approach. This approach reduces
the amount of sensitive information held by the trusted server, without reducing the data
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quality or precision. This approach is most effective when the participatory sensing system
is collecting data on something not specific to the individual. This alone is not well-suited
to a model where quasi-identifiers are a key submission component (such as in the case
of collection of public health data) as de-identification protection is still implemented at a
central trusted point, but overall it provides a good compromise.
2.3.2 Untrusted Servers
To reduce some privacy and security concerns, it is often proposed that eschewing a trusted
server approach may be appropriate, and having the participant device perform much of the
anonymizing and security protection before submission of data. As such, individual devices
pose much smaller targets for malicious attack, or improper use of collected data.
There are a number of participatory sensing privacy approaches [49] and the area con-
tinues to be active [50, 51]. Most approaches focus on the major challenge of participatory
sensing data collection i.e. providing privacy with fine location/time data submissions. Both
these data types are not core requirement for public health data collection so these advance-
ments are of limited utility for HPSNs.
Some alternative approaches include decentralized participatory sensing networks [52]
using user interaction/awareness as part of the approach and a "web of trust" where the
interactions of individual participants define their extended trust network and hence breadth
of dataset and sensitivity of data.
Alternatively, it is proposed that keeping the data managed by the participant [9, 53]
and stringent user-definable access control mechanisms to manage sharing could be used to
allow the use of human-centric sensing data.
A more recent approach [10] using distributed differential privacy appears promising and
the area of distributed privacy continues to be an active research area [54, 55]. However, the
same limitations that affect the trusted server differential privacy approaches exist for the
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distributed approach, including the current lack of suitability for health data [47].
2.3.3 Query Assurance
In addition to the issues of individual privacy and security is that of certainty of the accuracy
of the information distributed from the server to an individual. That is, that the information
distributed meets the requirements of correctness, completeness and freshness. Techniques
that can provide this certainty over a database/datasource are known as query assurance
approaches, and can be typically described according to two categories - probabilistic and
authenticated. The probabilistic approach uses known, fake or duplicate data to provide
strong evidence that the data is queried correctly. The authenticated approach usually em-
ploys a more traditional technique to provide assurance, using a combination of hashing/
digital signing and timestamps to ensure correct query replies. Most of the previous lit-
erature has focused on relational databases. Whether the data is encrypted or not varies
between schemes. In some cases, encryption is required to provide query assurance.
Authenticated Verification
Authenticated verification, where verification is a methodology to provide proof of integrity
or authenticity of data, typically uses various verification object models that have been pro-
posed to provide query assurance - for example some form of hashing/signing and times-
tamps in combination with database sorting/indexing.
As part of a query response, a verification object is generated and returned. This object
contains hashes that verify the data is correct, and a digital signature (signed by the data
owner) of the hashes that ensures the authenticity of the verification object. To address
freshness a timestamp is also signed [56].
Nested B+ Merkle Tree [57] is a form of embedded merkle hash tree that is specifically
tailored to XML data. The root tree is a path tree which preserves the path information,
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though path order is not preserved and equivalent paths are collapsed into an element in the
tree. Leaf nodes in the path tree contain a value tree and a parent tree. A value tree contains
the index to search element by value. The parent tree stores data relating to parent elements.
Through this conceptually clear method of deciding how to nest trees, the overall ver-
ification object size should be reduced. However, as with other solutions, if a path has an
extremely high number of nodes, large verification objects will be created to verify data.
One approach to remedy the issue of large verification object size is Embedded Merkle
Hash Trees [56], which provides an improvement to create more control of fan-out and
depth of merkle hash trees. It allows a more efficient tree structure through a higher control
of the size of the verification objects that will be needed.
A further approach suggested to improve the efficiency of authenticated query assurance
known as Partially Materialized Digest Scheme (PMDS) [58] like other authenticated query
assurance approaches, it is based on merkle hash trees. However, PMDS takes a novel
approach of considering that as creating a hash value is faster than performing file reads
from a hard drive, it is preferable to not instantiate the entire hash tree at any one time.
The digital signature on the root of the tree is created based on the temporary hash values,
and some of the lower branches of the tree are kept intact, but the rest of the hash tree is
then discarded rather than stored. When a query is made, the hash tree values are recreated
to verify the result, packaged with the digital signature and returned to the client. The
limitation of this approach is that to efficiently recreate the hash tree, the stored database
and the PMDS must be on the same server.
A more distinct form of authenticated verification is proposed in [59] where the data is
encrypted. Completeness and correctness are preserved by adding the node ID to the data
before encryption, and no queries apart from block retrieval are supported. Freshness is
addressed by adding a timestamp to the root node and disseminating the timestamp to users
directly.
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Though the final approach provides data confidentiality in addition to query assurance,
it is only capable of responding to very limited queries. This would likely affect the appli-
cability of this approach in health information system architectures.
Probabilistic Verification
Probabilistic query assurance is based on a fairly simple premise [60, 61]: if the data-owners
and clients have knowledge of a reasonable portion of the remote database, they can test
whether queries are being executed correctly, by batching a set of queries that execute over
both the known and unknown portions of the database. The query assurance provided is not
absolute, but it is considered that a reasonably high chance of detection of incorrect results
can be sufficient.
However, probabilistic systems do have distinct advantages, namely that in most cases,
no modification of the database server needs to be made, and that increases in overhead are
both easy to predict and quite reasonable, as the overhead is just a linear relation to database
size. A further advantage is that probabilistic query assurance can provide variable levels of
certainty based on how much extra data is allowed as overhead. More overhead allows for
a higher certainty of the returned queries being correct.
A non-trivial issue of the implementation of probabilistic query assurance relates to the
creation of non-pattern based data over the long-term that will not be detected. Dual Encryp-
tion [62], avoids this problem by encrypting the entire database in blocks with a symmetrical
key, then encrypting redundant data with a second key. Therefore, as the service provider
has no knowledge of the contents of any of the database, and as the key used for each por-
tion cannot be determined by the server, the redundant data cannot be detected. Thus the
client can, by querying from parts encrypted with both keys, provide a high level of query
assurance.
However, though a probabilistic approach seems well suited to query assurance over
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encrypted data, there are drawbacks that make it less optimal for health data. Firstly, the
assurance for the majority of records is based on an assumption that if the checked records
are correct, all returned records will be correct. This allows incorrect data to be returned
but not detected. While this could be acceptable for some applications, it is likely that
health information systems will require a higher level of assurance. Secondly, the approach
has to go to significant effort to mitigate query correspondence and distribution attacks. The
mitigations include for example query batching and delaying assurance checks. In the likely
health information architecture where distributed and numerous data repositories exist, this
could create a higher level of complexity that needs to be further investigated. Lastly, due
to the nature of this scenario, whereby there are multiple users of the system and they need
to have knowledge of the known portions of the database, keeping that knowledge from the
server providers and data sources is problematic, if they are also the owners of portions of
the health data.
Summary
Though there have been quite varied and distinct approaches in previous work, the more rel-
evant approach within the electronic public health domain is that of encrypted storage with
authenticated query assurance. This motivation was explored in our previous work [63] that
indicates the need to strengthen confidentially beyond the use of purely legislative mecha-
nisms, in relation to insider activities. However, there is no previous solution that provides
searchable encryption and robust authenticated query assurance. This chapter introduces a
model that incorporates both query assurance through an authenticated method and search-
able encryption. Further, we extend the freshness coverage to be more effective in cases
of data repositories with multiple data-owners, and elaborate its applicability to distributed
health information systems, including those where some data components may be stored
with consumers.
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2.4 Discussion
As covered in the earlier sections, the capabilities and potential for health participatory
sensing networks are quite unique and different from previous public health data collection
methodologies - even those where Internet technologies have also been utilized. However,
the nature of the data collection method creates significant privacy and security concerns,
beyond those which would be encountered in a regular participatory sensing network.
Review of the relevant literature for privacy and security approaches for participatory
sensing networks did not uncover an approach suitable for the type of data collected and
the interaction model for HPSNs described in this thesis. Typically, the limitation is that
most participatory sensing privacy approaches are focused on location privacy which is of
low usefulness for HPSNs which do not require fine-grained location access. Additionally,
most approaches to participatory sensing privacy don’t consider that the actual non-location
sensor data may be the most sensitive part of the collection and that de-identification of the
data and protection from re-identification is a key concern. This limitation continues when
considering data anonymization approaches - most of which require a trusted server to act
as a data aggregation point, which would be undesirable in a large scale health participatory
sensing system due to privacy risks and a single point of security failure.
This privacy concern appears to be a significant research gap - which will be addressed
within the implementation chapters that follow. Additionally, while the use of participatory
sensing or human-centric sensing for health or public health has often been proposed, details
of how this could occur and the capabilities, functionality and architecture to support such
an approach has not been sufficiently covered in prior research and will be introduced and
detailed in the following chapters.
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2.5 Conclusions
This chapter summarized the capabilities of health participatory sensing networks in the
context of existing public health data collection research, which were detailed as being
advanced and transformative over traditional data collection methods. Additionally, the
current state of the literature for the key challenges to health participatory sensing networks:
incentivization and privacy and security were summarized and gaps in the current research
were identified.
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3 HEALTH PARTICIPATORY SENSING NETWORKS
Preamble
This chapter is based on a journal paper that was published in the Journal of Mobile In-
formation Systems [1], it has been included as a chapter of this thesis with only minor
formatting changes to align with the thesis format. This chapter forms a foundation for
the following chapters, introducing the classification of health participatory sensing models,
and identifying distinct levels of interaction between individuals and a health participatory
sensing network. Additionally, a reference architecture describing the key capabilities and
requirements of the system to meet its purpose, provide privacy and security to individual
participants and finally, an example user scenario. These foundations are built on in the
latter chapters which provide technical details of the implementations and capabilities.

ABSTRACT
The use of participatory sensing in relation to the capture of health-related data, is rapidly
becoming a possibility, due to the widespread consumer adoption of emerging mobile com-
puting technologies and sensing platforms. This has the potential to revolutionize data col-
lection for population health, aspects of epidemiology, and health-related e-Science appli-
cations and as we will describe, provide new public health intervention capabilities, with the
classifications and capabilities of such participatory sensing platforms only just beginning to
be explored. Such a development will have important benefits for access to near real-time,
large-scale, up to population-scale data collection. However, there are also numerous issues
to be addressed first: provision of stringent anonymity and privacy within these method-
ologies, user interface issues, and the related issue of how to incentivize participants and
address barriers/concerns over participation. To provide a step towards describing these as-
pects, in this chapter we present a first classification of health participatory sensing models,
a novel contribution to the literature, and provide a conceptual reference architecture for
health participatory sensing networks (HPSNs) and user scenario example.
Keywords: Participatory Sensing - Public Health - Epidemiology - Mobile Health
3.1 Introduction
The use of health participatory sensing as a data collection methodology is rapidly becom-
ing a reality that will revolutionize the scale and types of data that can be aggregated for a
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number of population health, epidemiological, statistical and data analysis purposes. Par-
ticipatory sensing is the act of using mobile devices to allow public and professional users
to collect, analyze and submit or share local knowledge to a larger interactive participa-
tory sensing network [2]. The range of possibilities for participatory sensing is large [3],
however previous work in participatory sensing has not considered in detail the different
participatory models that are likely to occur in the health context. As these models have the
potential to scale to millions or nation-wide levels, both the potential and complexities of
these data systems are also substantial. This raises the need for a categorization of health
participatory sensing models and a description and analysis of the basic architectures pos-
sible. Interestingly, we also suggest in this work that beyond sensing alone, the possible
models of health participatory sensing may also often include elements of public health
intervention or two-way interaction.
The growth in the potential for participatory sensing has been largely accelerated through
the high levels of smartphone adoption in many countries [4], leading to the proliferation of
powerful sensing platforms that are highly human-centric, making them ideal as the center-
points for health participatory sensing models [5, 6, 7]. The potential capabilities are further
extended with the addition of ubiquitous external sensing components such as activity mon-
itoring [7] and other wearable consumer health sensors.
Contemporary commercial implementations such as Nike Fuel and Jawbone Up [7]
demonstrate the achievability and potential for continuous physical activity sensing. Jaw-
bone Up extends beyond physical activity monitoring to include sleep pattern and qual-
ity, and a nutritional diary. Other initiatives such as Cykelscore [5], Riderlog [6] and the
Copenhagen Wheel [8] are moving towards participatory sensing for specific usage groups.
Cykelscore acts as an active transportation data collection tool and incentive framework for
cycling, while Riderlog acts as just a collection tool. Alternatively, the Copenhagen wheel
goes beyond physical activity sensing, to urban environmental monitoring with air quality
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and noise sensors included in the implementation to provide additional data beyond just the
activity of the individual.
In the research domain, attempts to make data collection more automatic or less invasive
are being explored [9] and there also efforts to automate nutrition and dietary intake infor-
mation capture [10], with proposals including in relation to acoustical dietary intake [11],
specialized hardware [12, 13], and food image analysis [14]. Additionally, there are attempts
to make sensors more unobtrusively wearable, such as with projects like Heartphones [15]
– a coupling of a heart rate monitor with headphones and a mobile device.
Overall, this has led to a great improvement in potential capability, but with most re-
search focused on the use of such data collection by the individual, there has been less
attention given to the potential for and challenges to usage to provide population wellness
measures or for wider population health or population epidemiological usage. With the
growth in sensor capabilities now and in the near future, an analysis of health participatory
sensing capabilities, models and architectures is timely. In section two we provide a clas-
sification of health participatory sensing models, in section three we describe a conceptual
reference architecture for HPSNs, in section four we provide an example user scenario and
section five is the Conclusion.
3.2 Classification of Health Participatory Sensing Models
The classification of health participatory sensing models has not previously been formalized,
and the types of interaction not systematically identified or described. In this section we
classify health participatory sensing models according to five distinct categories and briefly
discuss the potential privacy, security, interface and incentivization aspects.
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3.2.1 Incidental Participatory Sensing
Incidental participatory sensing requires the lowest levels of participation by an individual.
It is defined as contributing sensor information for population health measures, which the
individual would have already collected for their own use or benefit [16]. An example of in-
cidental participatory sensing is physical activity self-tracking that has become increasingly
popular in recent years. Due to the nature of physical activity level as a risk or preventative
factor for a number of lifestyle-related diseases, it is also an important item for popula-
tion health and epidemiological data collection. In our previous work we have discussed in
greater depth the possibilities for such data collection for numerous secondary uses [17].
Demonstrating the low perceived privacy risk of sharing this data at least for some in-
dividuals, is the recent practice of sharing such physical activity or fitness data, often in
real-time, publicly via social media. Additionally, it is reasonable to predict that as mo-
bile device sensors evolve, the collection and utilization of data by individuals will also
expand to quantify further details of their activities, leading to increasingly rich and useful
incidental participatory data collection.
Due to the intrinsic self-motivation that users already have to collect some types of
sensor data, this category of participatory sensing benefits from the lowest ‘barrier to en-
try’, since individuals already contribute their own resources such as effort, time, CPU
processing, network bandwidth and device battery usage to achieve data capture. This
likely indicates that incentives to participate would be unneeded or minimal, if privacy con-
cerns/barriers can be avoided or minimized as indicated in previous work [18]. Sensors and
devices that are already acceptable in terms of user experience are already evidenced via
numerous commercially available sensor products.
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3.2.2 Passive Participatory Sensing
Passive participatory sensing is defined as sensor usage that requires explicit additional ef-
fort to enable data collection, which an individual would not have done unless they were
explicitly participating in population heath data capture, but does not attempt to and does
not require any change of the day-to-day behavior of the individual. For example, this could
include the individual using additional sensors that they would not have otherwise used, that
collect data, for example, relating to physical activity, diet, heart rate, sleep cycles or envi-
ronment, specifically to contribute to population data capture. This allows for a potentially
more complete data collection in comparison to what is possible through purely incidental
data collection. This brings to the fore the question of user motivation, once an individual
is required to contribute any significant additional effort to collect sensor data. Previous
work has discussed the idea of incentive schemes that use a market-based system [19] or
the preservation of social translucence [20]. Inherently incentives will continue to pose a
challenge to participatory sensing systems. In the health domain there is also the possibility
of further incentives – greater self-knowledge of health, information and risk assessment,
improved care, diagnostics, and possibly even an interest to contribute in a ‘citizen scientist’
capacity.
However, passive participatory sensing also increases privacy concerns. Since the data
collection is intrinsically something that would not otherwise have occurred, a higher level
of privacy responsibility rests with the collector. In a purely incidental approach, it is nec-
essary that any data that leaves the mobile device either be kept strictly de-identified (with
re-identification avoided) or securely and privately transmitted and stored. However, in a
passive participatory model, responsibility for the secure storage on the device is also of
import. This indicates that the type and characteristics of the HPSN architecture will vary
depending on the category of health participatory sensing that is deployed.
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3.2.3 Passive Participatory Sensing with Subjective Human-sensing and
Feedback
This model combines the potential sensing advantages of passive participatory sensing with
‘human-sensing’ capabilities, allowing for the large amounts of objective sensing data to be
complemented with subjective human-generated data and feedback. By human-sensing we
refer to manual information inputs or responses provided by individuals.
This could easily be implemented through the addition of context-sensitive micro-surveys
that are displayed to the user and attached to relevant collected sensor data. This would al-
low for both collection of data that is difficult to record through sensors alone, and also
allow data that may have been missed via sensor collection to be added to the overall collec-
tion. Additionally, where anomalous data has been collected by sensors, human-sensing and
feedback allows for validation to be performed by requesting subjective details or clarifica-
tion of the data collected. As discussed below, the load on the user to provide such manual
input would obviously need to be low.
Human-sensing has potential as a complement to sensor-based participatory sensing,
able to bridge the gaps or some limitations of sensing technology [21]. While it would in-
trinsically increase the effort required to participate, and would require a further challenge
to motivation, incentives and potential participation levels, it does not pose additional se-
curity concerns. This is apparent as it would not require direct one-to-one communication,
rather generic context rules and micro-surveys could be broadcast to all participants with the
processing of context and hence triggering of the additional data collection to occur locally.
This is described in further detail in section 3.3.2.
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3.2.4 Active Participatory Sensing
Active participatory sensing provides inputs to the individual to alter the actions they would
have taken whilst participating in the HPSN. Active participatory sensing in the health con-
text has a somewhat different goal to that of many other active participatory sensing con-
texts [22]. While an active participatory model for typical sensing might focus on affecting
individuals to collect a more complete data set in terms of spatial/temporal range, health and
epidemiological-related active participatory sensing would be more concerned with affect-
ing a health-related action and hence have a component equating to a public health inter-
vention. The instigation to carry out ‘active’ sensing activities could essentially constitute a
public health intervention action. As such, the behavioral change would be to firstly attempt
to improve the sensing data captured in terms of risk and preventative factors. Additionally
for public health goals, this allows for immediate and continuous feedback of the effective-
ness of campaigns on recipient groups. It is assumed that active participatory sensing would
have similar levels of technical sensor capabilities to passive, with the focus shifted to the
potential two-way communication that can be built on sensing data and an inherent feedback
loop.
This has the potential to be both a powerful data collection tool as well as a novel public
health intervention platform. Its potential scope includes the ability, in a timely and accurate
manner, to quantify precisely the effectiveness of public health interventions.
3.2.5 Active Participatory Sensing with Subjective Human-sensing and
Feedback
This final category incorporates the goals and framework of active participatory sensing but
adds subjective human-sensing and feedback - hence incorporating the most complete level
of data collection with public health intervention.
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As the most all-encompassing level of HPSN system that we have considered, it may
correspondingly have greater challenges in relation to motivation. However, it should be
noted that security and privacy provisions would be required to be no more stringent than
for that of either of its component parts. The interaction of these two components adds the
capability to give human-sensing or feedback related to a specific intervention. This is a
higher level of capability than that available in the other models. It also allows for more
complete and useful information to be collected by enhancing what can be detected through
sensors.
While this model represents the most complete functionality, in many cases it is likely
that not all its capabilities would be required or that the potential motivation challenges
may lead to a less comprehensive participatory sensing model being utilized for a particular
goal. This is expected, and suggests the material distinctions existing between the different
categories of health participatory sensing networks.
3.3 Health Participatory Sensing Network Conceptual Ref-
erence Architecture
3.3.1 Reference Architecture
The reference architecture proposed in this paper is able to support all models of health
participatory sensing described in Section 3.2. However, the emphasis in discussion is on the
most comprehensive models of HPSN such as described in Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. In the
discussion of this reference architecture, we also describe and emphasize how HPSNs can
achieve strict privacy and anonymity for all individual participants, via such technologies
and techniques as mix networks [23], k-anonymity, de-identification and submission of only
‘aggregate’ data.
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Fig. 3.1 Health Participatory Sensing Network Reference Architecture
The HPSN as a whole allows for the collection of various types of health-related data
and various user interactions depending on the category of HPSN being adopted. The user
will have granular control of the three types of interactions within the HPSN, as displayed
in Fig. 3.1 which are: (1) data collection and submission, (2) micro surveys and (3) health
interventions. At the coarsest level, each of these three functionalities can be disabled or
enabled, with more specific options also being provided in each area. For example, a HPSN
of the types described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 would require no micro-survey or health
intervention capabilities. An active HPSN as described in Section 3.2.4 would require data
collection and health intervention capabilities, but not micro-surveys. An active HPSN with
human-sensing as described in Section 3.2.5 would require all three capabilities.
Fig 3.1 shows a diagram of our conceptual reference architecture that would allow the
higher levels of privacy required to support health participatory sensing, along with the dis-
tributed and multi-party capabilities of the overall platform. This architecture would also
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include a number of different public health organizations utilizing and sharing a single dis-
tributed HPSN server group that communicates to participants via mix networks to preserve
the anonymity of the participants. A public health organization/health organization would
be defined as an organization involved in population data collection and/or public health
intervention.
Data collection is the process of automated collection and submission of anonymized
data. For the user, there is the ability to customize what data submission policy providers
(health organizations) they are subscribed to, as well as what types of data may be submit-
ted. An example would be of opting-in to submission of physical activity data to one health
organization, but physical activity and sleep patterns to a second organization. Additionally,
this can be adjusted on an individual policy level-basis rather than on specific categories. In
a similar way, micro-surveys and health interventions can be opted into, with specific cate-
gories of interventions and types of micro-surveys being customizable. The distribution of
data policies, micro-surveys and health interventions takes this granular nature into account,
only distributing the selected categories/policies to an individual’s device.
Data policies, health interventions and micro-surveys are distributed to an individual’s
device based on the customizations discussed above. This is achieved by the user mobile de-
vice periodically polling for updated policy sets based on the specific customization. How-
ever, beyond broad user customization for health interventions and micro-surveys, once on
the device, only the most personalized/suited of those distributed is enacted on the mobile
device, based on local processing so as to further maintain privacy (see Section 3.3.4). The
best fit surveys/interventions are displayed/completed and responses then stored for data
submission/analysis.
The functionality introduces a feedback loop - not for the individual, but for a general-
ized group. Once data is submitted to the server, including the automated data collection,
micro-surveys and specific details of health interventions deployed, this can then be used
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to adapt the later policies, survey and health interventions distributed. This can have both
automated and manually supervised aspects to it.
3.3.2 Distribution of Data Collection Policy Rules and Micro Surveys
Whilst Protecting Recipient Anonymity and Privacy
The HPSN data collection methodology has a number of advantages due to being able to
collect near real-time population-wide data, and adjust the data collected when needed.
As such, this requires a robust process for distribution of updated data collection poli-
cies, micro-surveys and health interventions, with the key requirements that updates be dis-
tributed in a timely and accurate manner. An addition to this, that is specific to anonymous
data collection, is that of the critical need to preserve individual user privacy. The conven-
tional approach would be to distribute personalized encrypted data updates through a mix
network. While this would meet the requirement for anonymous distribution, as no detail
of the individual is known, it also provides the data policy owner with specific details of the
policies distributed to individual participants. To allow for greater efficiencies and provide
a higher level of privacy, a generic distribution approach using the mix nodes themselves as
distributed servers would provide an elegant solution.
To support the collection of anonymized data, distribution should be achieved through
transmission of general policies packaged and distributed broadly. Additionally, the use
of a multi-purpose HPSN with multiple public health organizations involved also raises the
issue of quality assurance of the messages throughout the network that may have come from
various different senders and sent through a distributed multi-user network. As such, the
completeness (all the requested data is retrieved), correctness (the data returned is accurate
and has not been modified) and freshness (the data is the most up to date version available)
need to be assured.
A granular approach utilizing verification objects constructed by hashing and digital
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signing of distributed content can assure the completeness and correctness of data. Addi-
tionally, the inclusion of timestamps and expiry rates can assure the freshness of distributed
data without direct communication to the associated public health organization. Our previ-
ous work found that user CPU time and data overheads of this type of approach can be quite
minimal [24]; without significant additional overheads for the data owners/distributer.
This approach would additionally allow for dissemination and retrieval of data through
the anonymous communications network, with users retrieving policy updates and interven-
tions relevant to them only, without breaching their anonymity.
To do this efficiently while improving privacy, we have considered the use of an adapted
query assurance process suitable for distributed data sources [24]. This would allow for the
nodes in the mix network to cache general data and just distribute the requested subset to
requests - without the policy owner being aware or involved in this efficient distribution.
Going into further detail, this approach uses signed verification objects distributed with
policy data that allow the policy content to be verified in a granular way - that is, even if
only a small portion of the policy data is delivered to an individual user, verification can be
assured at reasonable levels of overhead. This is achieved by the use of sorted and signed
merkle hash verification trees. Each policy block will be hashed and stored as a leaf node in
the merkle hash tree with the branches to the root comprised of a hash of the branches/leaves
below. Finally, the root is signed by the policy owner with a digital timestamp attached and
included in the signed value. Due to the signed nature of the verification tree, the policy
data distributed can be authenticated as correct. As the tree is sorted, completeness can be
assured by attaching border values with any policy distribution. Finally, due to the expiring
timestamp, the distribution of old/expired policies can be detected and discarded.
In Fig. 3.2 the organization of a policy distribution verification tree is displayed. It
allows for many layers of branches depending on the size of the data set. Further, based
on the data requested, a subset of this tree would be packaged as a verification object and
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Fig. 3.2 Policy Distribution Verification Tree Structure
Fig. 3.3 Verification Tree Accessing
distributed with the policy data to allow for verification. The verification tree contains three
specific types of nodes - root, branch and leaf.
The verification tree structure is shown in Fig. 3.3 and contains four primary elements
as follows:
• Root_node(S(Ts,H((Child_node1), . . . ,(Child_noden−1),(Child_noden))),Ts: Given
S means the contents are digitally-signed, Ts is a time stamp with expiry duration,
H means the contents are hashed and Child_node refers to the H value stored in
Branch_node or Lea f _node directly below the root.
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• Branch_node(H((Child_node1), ...,(Child_noden−1),(Child_noden)), Index_value):
Given H means the contents are hashed, Child_node refers to the H value stored in
Branch_node or Lea f _node directly below the current branch and Index_value is the
sort value of the branch.
• Branch_S_node(S(Ts,H((Child_node1), . . . ,(Child_noden−1),(Child_noden))),Ts, Index_value):
Similar to the Root_node, the Branch_S_node contains a digital signature and an ex-
piring time stamp. Additionally, it also contains the Index_value as the sort value
of the branch. The intention is that by providing signed branch nodes throughout the
verification tree, in proximity to often retrieved leaves or clusters of leaves, the overall
efficiency of the verification scheme can be improved overtime based on usage.
• Lea f _node(H(M,Record_Path),Record_Path,Read_Count,Write_Count): Given H
is the hash of its contents and M is the stored record. Record_Path is the direct path
to the record, Read_Count and Write_Count are metrics to track the activity on indi-
vidual leaves of the verification object.
3.3.3 Anonymous Data Collection and Submission
The utilization of a methodology for anonymous submission of collected data is necessary in
all implementations that do not incorporate a trusted server, and this capability alone should
remove much of the potential and perceived privacy risks of a health participatory sensor
network. Two such possible extant examples are mix networks [23] (Fig 3.1) and onion
routing networks [25]. Either would be capable of allowing for anonymous submission,
with onion routing having some additional advanced capabilities. With the addition of an
anonymous submission network, the remaining primary privacy concern relates to the data
submitted.
Secure de-identified approaches have gained specific coverage in the health context [26]
due to the often highly sensitive nature of the data details. Conversely, such data has great
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importance as a source for research and epidemiology. Typically, de-identification works
by removing or making less specific identifiers and quasi-identifiers. This leads to a k-
anonymity type approach where as long as k number of individuals are indistinguishable
from each other and do not have sensitive details in common, data privacy is considered
to be preserved. This has been extended into the sensing context with spatial k-anonymity
explored in [27]. However, assured k-anonymity approaches in most cases require a trusted
server or aggregator to perform this analysis and decision making based on data received.
This is hard to achieve in an anonymous submission distributed network that attempts to
reduce the need for highly secure trusted components. The alternative is to make de-
identification decisions locally without external knowledge of the potential k value of col-
lected values, though this is not as assuredly secure as a trusted model. The advantage of
reducing the sensitivity at the initial level of the mobile device before submission is promis-
ing.
A novel infrastructure approach is required to address the inherent property of de-
tailed sensor data that even if de-identified could still act as a privacy risk through later
re-identification of the individual with other known data. This risk can be reduced by sub-
mitting only less detailed and aggregate data [28]. In the public health domain, this raises
the question of ‘what is sufficient data for public health uses?’. It seems likely that more
detailed information than is currently collected by traditional methodologies could be sub-
mitted without significant privacy risks, due to the very broad nature of population-wide
health measures as potential preventative and risk factors.
This is made possible through storing detailed sensor data locally, then performing
anonymizing/aggregation on the data before submission. This includes removing any overly
rare and identifying demographic information, making any temporal or location details more
general and generating calculated aggregate measures based on the detailed data. This al-
lows potentially long-term analysis to be performed on the device and submitted without
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the server needing to know the sensitive detailed history.
The types of data that could be collected through this approach are quite varied, espe-
cially with the potential capabilities of extending the sensing component through micro-
surveys and feedback, and through future advancements of health sensor technologies.
Some examples that are often of interest in previous large-scale health data collection are:
• Physical Activity Patterns and Intensity - Due to its significance as a preventative
factor in a number of lifestyle diseases, it is of high importance when considering a
population-wide health participatory sensing model. The physical activity can usually
be split between the following three categories.
– Work Related Activity: The amount and intensity of physical activity completed
during work.
– Recreational Activity: Activity that is not associated with work or transportation.
– Transportation Activity: Active transportation (walking, cycling or similar) as
a form of physical activity that coincides with travel. Active transportation is a
focus of public policy in many regions [29].
• Nutritional, Caloric Burn and Caloric Intake - This type of data could provide more
detailed information on overall energy expenditure and nutritional intake of individu-
als, segments of the population and the population overall [30].
• Body Mass Index (BMI) and change over time - This would allow for a current snap-
shot of BMI, with the potential for trend analysis, based on the individual/community
change over time.
• Sleep Patterns and Regularity - Sleep patterns are both an indicator and a preventa-
tive/risk factor for a number of conditions.
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As indicated, all these types of data can be submitted using the fully privacy-preserving
and anonymization mechanisms described. With that result that only population aggregate
measures are to be stored at the public health organizations for population health purposes.
3.3.4 Public Health Interventions
A major area of potential usefulness of HPSNs is the ability to distribute targeted or per-
sonalized public health interventions to individuals (see Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5). It may
appear that to do so implicitly requires potentially identifying details to be known by the
server, which may affect willingness and motivation to participate in such a network.
However, the sensitivity of health related information and the capability of the proposed
reference architecture suggests a novel approach to non-identifying targeted public health
interventions.
Additionally, it seems likely that there will be a number of different public health or-
ganizations that would be interested in participating in these types of networks, whereby
individuals are able to subscribe or opt-in to partake in passive or active participation with
each individual organization.
The novel approach introduced, involves broadcasting larger generalized public health
intervention packages to the entirety of the participants or subsets. Then based on local
processing, the correct information or intervention information is displayed or actioned on
individual devices. This would allow for communication with individuals that could be
meaningful and personalized without risk of re-identification of the individual. This ap-
proach could also be used for the dissemination of micro-surveys to individuals for data
collection for the applicable models of HPSN.
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3.3.5 HPSN and Participant Device Interaction
The participant device will have the following capabilities to interact with the network
(Fig. 3.4):
• De-identification – This component manages the de-identification of data prior to sub-
mission by making specifics of the data less sensitive and individually identifying if
necessary. This is actioned by a consideration of the organization subscription poli-
cies which will identify what data is to be submitted and at what particular level of
detail.
• Micro-surveys – An opt-in additional component (see Sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.5) that
would allow the public health organizations to enact additional data collection by
context-aware micro-surveys to complement or enhance the sensor data collection.
• Local Aggregate Processing – Calculates aggregate measures [28] according to rules
delivered through the participatory network. This also takes into account local rules
and is conscious of potential re-identification risks when allowing data submission.
• Intervention Delivery – An opt-in additional component that retrieves general inter-
ventions targeted at particular demographic groups (see Sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5).
These interventions are then locally processed according to the individual’s data to
present the correct targeted intervention to the end user.
• Subscription policies – This component will allow an individual to control which pub-
lic health organizations they interact with, and the opt-in and opt-out of capabilities
and collection offered. For example, an individual may choose to collect data and re-
ceive interventions from an organization X, while only collecting data and opting out
of interventions from organization Y. This could be provided to a detailed granular
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Fig. 3.4 Network and Participant Device Communication
level where individuals can collect for only a specific measure or receive communi-
cation on a very narrow topic.
• Sensing policies – Local policies defined by the user that set limitations as to what and
how they will participate in the HPSN. This would include which sensors are used,
battery management policy, time and detail limitations, amongst others.
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3.4 User Scenario
For our example purposes, let us consider user David who is a participant in a HPSN.
David is subscribed to the Department of Health, and to the Active Transport Initiative
Inc. data collection policies. Additionally, he has also subscribed to micro-surveys from
Active Transport Inc. and health interventions from the Department of Health.
The subscribed to policies, micro-surveys and health interventions are updated periodi-
cally. This is controlled by either the client checking for updates, with the maximum valid
period of a set of policies set by an expiring timestamps; one referring to the distribution pro-
cess (maximum time before the data should no longer be distributed) and a second referring
to the expected validity period (maximum period before the policy needs to be updated).
Throughout his daily schedule, David’s mobile device automatically collects physical
activity data and relevant data to each organization is submitted intermittently throughout
the day utilizing the privacy-preserving mechanisms of the HPSN. Again, this can be totally
anonymous and does not allow re-identification – it can just provide a valuable input when
combined with the mass of other individual’s data, for population health measures.
More specifically, the Department of Health is interested in overall physical activity in a
day with age bracket and coarse location information also submitted. Alternatively, Active
Transport Initiative Inc. is only concerned with physical activity related to transportation
(e.g. walking/cycling commuting) with the additional data of age bracket and start coarse
location and end coarse location submitted. Occasionally during the day/ very infrequently,
David is prompted to complete a micro-survey related to active transport. This is a 30
second survey, for example, asking for a ranking of the five most significant factors as to
whether on a specific day he would cycle/walk to work. This micro-survey was presented to
David based on the locally stored data relating to his travel habits – although it would have
been sent to a much larger group. As an average two day per week cycle commuter, he is
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a prime target for increase in active transport modal share. David’s preferences also restrict
how often micro-surveys from individual organizations and the overall HPSN system can
request micro-surveys.
Based on his personal preferences and previous trend data, David is also prompted by
a health intervention from the Department of Health, suggesting the health benefits of cy-
cling. This suggestion is computed on his local device based on the typical time of day
that David exercises, current weather patterns including UV rating and potential vitamin D
intake levels. David chooses not to take up the suggestion of this intervention, triggering a
wait-time (set by David’s preferences) as to how soon a new intervention can be received.
David is also interested to track his own health-related data and finds this a benefit that
also assists his motivation to participate in the HPSN. The data he displays to himself for
this purpose is kept securely on his own device, and is never transmitted to the HPSN – for
this reason, this data for self-use, can be more detailed and can be viewed by David without
aggregation processing [28] having first occurred if desired.
3.5 Conclusion
The utilization of health participatory sensing networks for population health and epidemi-
ological data collection is a development that can greatly increase the capability and scale
of health data collection.
The challenges to this approach however are not insignificant, with privacy and incen-
tives to participate, being core concerns affecting the level of participation and therefore
potential data collection.
In this chapter, we have introduced the first classification of health participatory sensing
networks, and discussed these classifications with particular reference given to the required
level of effort for individuals, privacy concerns as well as potential realizable benefits and
incentives.
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In this work, we have also defined a conceptual reference architecture that supports the
capabilities required for the more highly detailed health participatory sensing categories,
that includes anonymous submission and secure de-identification - this would have signifi-
cant advantages that may positively affect participation, as compared to a more traditional
trusted server methodology. We have also described a user scenario in detail.
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4 QUERY ASSURANCE FOR DISTRIBUTION OF HPSN DATA
COLLECTION RULES AND INTERVENTIONS
Preamble
This chapter extends on a journal paper that was published in the Journal of Health Sys-
tems [1], it has been included as a chapter of this thesis with a significant rewrite to align
more closely with the overall theme of the thesis, as part of the re-write the related work
section has been moved to Chapter 2 and the future work moved to Chapter 7. In addi-
tion, formatting changes were made to align with the thesis format. This chapter is the first
implementation/evaluation chapter, expanding on the solution first introduced in subsection
3.3.2 in the previous chapter. The present chapter is concerned with the technical details
of distribution of data collection policy rules, micro-surveys and public health interventions
within the health participatory sensing network. That is, this chapter covers the content
distribution component of the overall architecture, while later implementation chapters will
cover the anonymity and privacy protections, specifically the utilization of onion routing and
content aware de-identification to reduce privacy risks (Chapter 5), and the implementation
of public health interventions (Chapter 6).
The distribution of health participatory sensing content is a key challenge, within a
health participatory sensing network, as it is highly likely that any successful system would
have multiple public health organizations/groups utilizing the data collection and public
health intervention capabilities - requiring a multiple data owner system, where accuracy
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can be assured. Additionally, a distributed system is favorable as it provides scale and po-
tentially privacy benefits, as potential breaches of privacy would require collusion between
multiple distributed nodes. These issues are discussed further in chapter 5, including a pro-
totype implementation and results.
ABSTRACT
Health information system architectures inherently include distributed systems and data
repositories across multiple organizations, health providers and with potentially some data
stored with the health consumer. This is part of the shift to more fully integrated elec-
tronic health systems. Due to the varied stakeholders of these systems, it will become more
important to provide a high level of query quality assurance for the parties utilizing these
distributed and shared data repositories. A specific example of a distributed health data
model is that of a HPSN (Health Participatory Sensing Networks), where the data collection
rules and public health interventions are created and distributed by multiple stakeholders in
the form of public health groups/organizations and the detailed data is stored with individual
participants. A core consideration of the HPSN approach is providing data confidentiality,
including protecting against insider security threats. As such, it will often be desirable that
communication between the health groups and the individuals be stored/transmitted in an
encrypted format. In this chapter, we present and describe the implementation and evalua-
tion of a query assurance model that implements the three requirements of query assurance
across sources of searchable encrypted data. Further, we consider the issue of freshness and
data persistence in a multiple data-owner environment, including a discussion of the char-
acteristics of consumer interfacing health information systems.
Keywords: Consumer Health - Query Assurance - System Architecture - Health Sensors
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4.1 Introduction
Public health information systems intrinsically entail complex distributed systems and data
repositories, due to the increasingly integrated nature of national and global health sys-
tems [2]. This shift will consolidate public health information across multiple organiza-
tions, health providers and in the case of participatory sensing data stored with the health
consumer, to provide more efficient and effective public health. In the model for health par-
ticipatory sensing systems shown in Figure 4.1, we consider that there will be a number of
health participatory sensing servers owned and operated by individual groups/organizations
distributing information and collection information from individual HPSN participants ei-
ther directly or through Web services.
Under this multiplication of disparate data sources, contributors and data-owners, where
complete trust between all parties cannot be assumed, the challenge is to have an efficient
and effective way to verify and combine all data that is distributed to the HPSN participant.
This suggests the need for a unifying approach to query assurance, where query assurance
is defined as the data source accurately responding to queries by meeting the requirements
of correctness, completeness and freshness.
In this HPSN scenario, it quickly becomes clear that there will be significant new con-
cerns not previously considered in traditional database models. Parallels can be drawn be-
tween this model and similar new database models [3, 4], which consider among their se-
curity concerns, data confidentiality and query assurance or integrity. Within the domain of
health, information accuracy and confidentiality are of primary concern, due to the sensitive
nature of the data stored. As such, a scheme that combines data confidentiality and query
assurance, without substantially diminishing the usability of the information, is an impor-
tant initial step. Further, we consider that it should be applicable over heterogeneous types
of health data and highly scalable.
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Fig. 4.1 Distributed Public Health Information System Architecture or HPSN
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Query assurance covers the requirement that the returned query result should provide
assurance of [5, 3, 6]:
• Correctness - The data returned is accurate, created by the data-owner and not modi-
fied in any way.
• Completeness - The data returned is the entirety of the matching result set.
• Freshness - The data returned is the current up to date version of a record.
For encrypted distributed data that does not provide query support (just retrieval of a
single indexed record), completeness and correctness are inherently provided. Since the
data will only be retrieved by an index or block number, it follows that if a record is returned
that corresponds to the ID requested, completeness is assured [7]. Further, the use of secure
encryption over all data ensures the record was created by the data-owner and that there was
no third-party modification.
However, in the domain of health participatory sensing networks, more than a minimum
rudimentary level of querying (such as that provided by [7, 8] that provided encrypted block
retrieval) of outsourced data will be required, such as search term, attribute or range queries.
Additionally, queries will bring together information from multiple sources, making com-
pleteness a concern. It is also an issue, that without assurance of the freshness of the data
component of the record, the returned results may reflect out-of-date or stale data. Further,
we consider that cooperative groups within the health sector may prefer to combine health
information, thus creating the scenario where a health participatory sensing server will have
multiple data-owners, thereby potentially complicating these issues further.
The following sections of the chapter discuss these issues in greater detail. The problem
definition section identifies the key components required for health participatory sensing
server data storage in current and emerging health information systems. Related work dis-
cusses the most relevant prior approaches to query assurance and identifies any issues that
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may affect the suitability of prior approaches for application with HPSN data. In the Pro-
posed Novel Approach to Secure Query Assurance section, we propose a new approach that
is tailored to meet the requirements in the problem definition and extends from our previous
work to provide an analytical evaluation of scalability. Finally, we present the details of
our test implementation and evaluation results discussion in the Experiment and Evaluation,
Results and Discussion sections.
4.2 Problem Definition
The distribution of data collection rules and public health interventions within HPSNs ne-
cessitates the use of scalable and distributed systems, due to the interaction of multiple
groups and the potential number of participants. This is an emerging reality of the multi-
site, multi-organization, health participatory sensing systems. However, provision of a se-
cure implementation with assurance of the quality of the information remains an issue. This
is especially true due to the expectation that information will be moving between different
organizations/groups that are owners of data within the larger system. We consider a central
issue of this problem to be that of encrypted data storage and retrieval.
In this model, we consider that the information system is vulnerable to both external
attacks as well as internal attackers at the distributed data repositories who have privileged
access to parts of the system. External attackers are already quite well addressed with ac-
cess control and communication security. In our assessment of the problem, we consider
that insider attackers have full access to the system, but do not have access to individual
data owner’s private encryption keys (this holds for both symmetrical and public key cryp-
tography used in the approach).
Based on our previous work and consideration of the most closely related database mod-
els namely multi data-owner, outsourced or cloud data repository approaches we conclude
that the following three key components will need to be present in the database implemen-
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tation:
• Data confidentiality - The data stored must only be retrievable by authorized users.
Further, the data should not be viewable by the data repository operators at any point.
• Query Assurance - The data returned from a query is the complete, unaltered and
freshest version of the stored records at any particular point in time.
• Efficient and secure storage - The overheads created by providing the other require-
ments should not significantly impact on the efficiency of the data storage.
The proposed novel solution detailed later in this chapter will address these three points
through the use of searchable encryption, authenticated query assurance and efficiency ad-
justments that will be demonstrated through the implementation and evaluation.
4.3 Proposed Novel Approach for Secure Query Assurance
We consider that to provide query assurance to public health information data repositories,
an authenticated query assurance approach is preferred. This is due to the level of integrity
being more strongly guaranteed for all data as opposed to probabilistic approaches. Addi-
tionally, as it is external to the data repository it can easily be applied to data spread across
heterogeneous data sources or scaled out independently to the data repositories themselves.
Lastly, it doesn’t require the participants of the HPSN to have additional knowledge of the
data stored as in the case of a probabilistic approach. Further, previous work has applied
it across various types of database; SQL [9], XML [10, 11] and tree-indexed data [7]. In
our approach to this issue, we consider that our previous work [11] provides a good starting
point. In addition to previous functionality, support for the following is required:
1. Trapdoor encryption of Index keywords to limit or avoid inference attacks
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2. A more robust freshness approach for multiple data-owners, that not only ensures the
up to date nature of the record, but that the previous update was correctly applied and
persisted.
3. Encryption of public health information data collection rules/interventions
In the following subsections, we first describe the methodology by which query as-
surance integrity is provided. We then discuss the other important areas of the methodol-
ogy: encryption, granularity, timestamps and digital signatures, maintenance and additional
freshness assurance. The considerations that were made in applying these components to
the implementation and any issues and limitations are detailed.
4.3.1 Public Health Data Query Assurance Method
In our approach to storing electronic public health information, we propose to extend our
previous query assurance solution to address point 2 of the required functionality with
additional freshness protection provided. The approach is primarily comprised of a self-
balancing merkle hash tree with additional information stored in the root, branch and the
leaf nodes to provide the query verification required.
This approach is differentiated from previous approaches, through the use of additional
signed nodes at common branch nodes of regularly accessed records to decrease the time
required and verification object size of queries on average.
The verification tree structure is shown in Figure 4.2. The verification tree is sorted
based on an Indexvalue. This could be a unique path to the retrievable element, such as the
details of repository, table/location and unique primary key/identifier, or a search term or
attributes of the record could also be used. In general, it is expected a number of verification
trees would be created in many cases to support more flexible querying. The verification
tree structure contains four primary elements as follows:
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Fig. 4.2 Verification Tree Accessing Pre Maintenance
• Root_node(S(Ts,H((Child_node1), . . . ,(Child_noden−1),(Child_noden))),Ts: Given
S means the contents are digitally-signed, Ts is a timestamp with expiry duration,
H means the contents are hashed and Child_node refers to the H value stored in
Branch_node or Lea f _node directly below the root.
• Branch_node(H((Child_node1), ...,(Child_noden−1),(Child_noden)), Index_value):
Given H means the contents are hashed, Child_node refers to the H value stored in
Branch_node or Lea f _node directly below the current branch and Index_value is the
sort value of the branch.
• Branch_S_node(S(Ts,H((Child_node1), . . . ,(Child_noden−1),(Child_noden))),Ts, Index_value):
Similar to the Root_node, the Branch_S_node contains a digital signature and an ex-
piring timestamp. Additionally, it also contains the Index_value as the sort value of
the branch. The intention is that by providing signed branch nodes throughout the ver-
ification tree, in proximity to often retrieved leaves or clusters of leaves, the overall
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efficiency of the verification scheme can be improved overtime based on usage.
• Lea f _node(H(M,Record_Path),Record_Path,Read_Count,Write_Count): Given H
is the hash of its contents and M is the stored record. Record_Path is the direct path
to the record, Read_Count and Write_Count are metrics to track the activity on indi-
vidual leaves of the verification object.
The verification tree provides correctness, completeness and freshness in the following man-
ner:
• Correctness: The hash of the stored data is kept in a leaf node, which through being
propagated up the tree through multiple levels of hashing before being signed at the
root node or a signed branch, ensures that the returned data can be verified. This
approach is taken because digitally signing each individual element can be quite ex-
pensive in terms of CPU resources. Attempts have been made in previous works [9,
12] to improve the efficiency.
• Completeness: To ensure completeness when the verification object is returned with
the query, the sibling leaf to either side of the result is returned as shown in Figure 4.2.
Since the verification tree is sorted based on the index/keyword queried, this provides
certainty that the entire result set is returned.
• Freshness: An expiring timestamp is stored in the root node and any signed branches.
This allows the data owner to vary the length of expiry and hence the required fre-
quency of updates/keep-alives required on the verification tree. This places a limit on
the period of time that old data and its associated verification object can be used.
Finally, the verification tree can be used to sync just the records that have changed since
a previous sync, by navigating the verification tree, rather than querying against temporal or
logging data within the database.
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In the following subsections, we go into further details into the query assurance method-
ology, identifying methodology decisions and their justifications.
Timestamps and Digital Signatures
Timestamps and digital signatures play a significant role in query assurance and efficiency of
distributed public health information database solutions. All verification objects need to be
time-stamped and digitally signed at their root to prove query correctness/completeness/freshness.
This approach is quite well researched and understood [13, 7, 10]. However, previous ap-
proaches only considered a single timestamp/signature, with no consideration given to the
following:
1. Propagation of the timestamp to users in set timestamp systems.
2. Calculation of an appropriate expiry rate in expiring timestamp systems.
As such, it seems beneficial that elements that are modified frequently should be covered
by a timestamp with a shorter duration, while less frequently updated elements only need a
basic coverage. Further, more critical areas of the database may be considered more time
sensitive beyond the standard usage metrics. So, in cooperation with a hash granularity
scheme, it is possible for a database to be separated into correct granularity, and then times-
tamps + signature added to particularly high throughput sections to enable a higher possible
efficiency for the bulk of the database operations.
As a further consideration, as each individual timestamp may now only cover a smaller
number of nodes - (that may be accessed often, but not modified), the performance of veri-
fication retrieval can be improved by needing smaller verification objects, without the need
to refresh many timestamps at short expiry rates.
In our approach we use expiring timestamps, with expiry rates and placement of signed
nodes adjusted during the maintenance portion of the implementation.
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Maintenance
Of importance to this approach is the use of maintenance to adjust the verification trees in
order to improve efficiency. These measures attempt to optimize the verification objects so
that the most common queries are the most efficient based on the read rates.
The operations possible to increase efficiency that we have identified in our approach
are:
1. Increase or decrease hash granularities to more closely match the size of the queried
elements.
2. Increase or decrease the duration of timestamps based on the modification rate.
3. Placing or removing additional signed nodes in proximity to high access leaf nodes.
4. Adjust the depth and breadth of the tree by increasing or decreasing the maximum
child nodes per branch.
The high access nodes have digitally signed nodes added to a common ancestor, as
shown in Figure 4.3. The outcome of this is that the size of the verification object (the
amount of data that needs to be returned) is significantly reduced. Please see [11] for fur-
ther information on possible algorithms that can be used in carrying out this maintenance
operation.
In the extended approach in this chapter that focuses on encrypted public health data,
only 2 and 3 from above are incorporated. The switch to encrypted records, as well as
limiting the types of queries that can be performed against the records, also removes the
necessity for hash granularity modification. Similarly, the adjustment of child nodes per
branch is problematic to optimize when incorporating searchable trapdoor encryption.
82 Query Assurance for Distribution of HPSN Data Collection Rules and Interventions
Fig. 4.3 Verification Tree Accessing Post Maintenance
Additional Freshness Assurance
In our approach, we digitally sign and include a timestamp at the root and specific branches
of the merkle hash tree that are in proximity to highly accessed leaf nodes. An additional
problem of shared databases with multiple data-owners, is that though the insert/update may
appear to have been correctly applied and can then be subsequently queried against, there
is limited protection against the database later reverting to an earlier state, as the server
could be resigned by a different data-owner to give the appearance of a fresh data source.
To alleviate this issue, the following approach can be used. Store the last signed time and
signature for each data-owner in a separate metadata node directly below the root as shown
in Figure 4.4. In cases where there are a significant number of data-owners, the metadata
node could be expanded to become a branch rather than a node to allow more efficient
re-signing.
Through this implementation, each individual data-owner, when next resigning the root
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Fig. 4.4 Verification Tree with Metadata Node
node can check that the previous changes have persisted. This would be conducted by
checking that the latest signature of a particular data-owner is still stored in the metadata
node, as the individual data-owners metadata is signed by their unique private key. This
provides assurance of persistence; however, it is still possible for a different data-owner to
make changes to the stored data. Alternatively, the data-owner can intermittently check this
value through the same method. In any case, in the event of data having not been persisted
in the database, the event is detectable, and any data that has not been recorded is auditable
and with sufficient logs/cache recoverable.
Granularity
Granularity has been a concern for authenticated query assurance [14]. Ideally data queried
from a database would neatly coincide with the portions of the database that are hashed/digitally
signed together. Merkle hash tree and other hash objects neatly addressed this problem by
hashing uniform sections of the database and sorting them in a tree where only the root
node needs a digital signature. This eliminated the need for most of the expensive public
key cryptography that occurred in other works [15, 16]. This type of hashing will be referred
to as uniform database hashing.
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Uniform database hashing, depending on its usage, has the potential for inefficiencies.
Coarse granularity and more of the database than is actually required to answer the clients
query will need to be retrieved and transmitted, and fine granularity where there is the
potential for the hashes/verification object to be a significant portion of the returned data.
However, if a database granularity is closely matched to how the database is used (using
knowledge of its application/uses) an efficient granularity level can be chosen. However,
it still has the weakness of needing outside intervention to adjust granularity if database
applications change over time.
Another approach is to hash at every granularity, creating verification trees for each
granularity. With this approach the granularity should always match the size of the query
returned. However, it comes at the cost of much more verification data being stored, and a
higher initial processing cost.
An alternative to uniform database hashing is variable database hashing. The difference
is focused on how the hashed/signed portions are created. In more detail, granularity is
adjusted based on database usage habits, rather than pre-set. Effective use could be in
keeping the less used parts of a large database at a comparably coarse granularity. The
wasted data retrieval is offset by the decreased verification data storage/sorting. On the other
hand, heavily accessed portions of a database should have a granularity that most closely
resembles the majority of query requests. In this case, the portion that is smaller than the
granularity has to be weighed against the increased verification object size resulting from
including a greater number of hashes.
In our approach, we previously utilized variable hash granularity to improve efficiency [11].
However, this approach is not applicable when utilizing encryption, and so, therefore, in this
application we used uniform database hashing based on the encrypted record size.
4.3 Proposed Novel Approach for Secure Query Assurance 85
4.3.2 Encryption of Health Information Records and Trapdoor En-
cryption of Index and Search Terms
Due to the sensitive nature of electronic public health data, and the need for data confiden-
tiality, we consider that the implementation of any scheme requires, as a minimum, com-
patibility with data encryption (to address point 3 of the requirements). In our approach we
allow encryption of the records, specifically in the implementation we utilize a AES encryp-
tion for record storage – this could be accomplished with one or many keys based on the
data-owners and usage model. Key management would be applied through the application
tiers/web services rather than at the data repository level. The downside of this encryption
implementation is the limitation of the types of queries that can be performed.
For the electronic health information stored within these data repositories to be usable, a
form of searchable encryption needs to be provided (to address point 1 of the requirements).
There have been a number of different approaches suggested in previous work [17, 18, 19].
In our approach we use a simple form of searchable symmetrical encryption using a trapdoor
of the search keyword or index:
T (w,sw): Given a keyword w and the secret key sw.
When the data is stored or updated or additional keywords/indexes are created, the
T (w,sw) is then stored in the index trees as the Index_value. When a query is attempted,
the client encrypts the keyword, sends it to the server and the server processes the query by
matching the encrypted keyword to the one previously stored. Therefore, the server can ac-
curately answer the query without having knowledge of the search keyword or the contents
of the record. The specific type of searchable encryption utilized in this chapter, is limited in
the types of queries that can be performed, i.e. queries and hence query assurance is limited
to exact match keyword/index based queries.
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4.3.3 Scalability
The size of the returned verification object will have the largest effect on efficiency and
scalability of querying operations. The other components of the verification module being:
1. Hashing the retrieved data O(1), 2. Verifying the digital signature and timestamp O(1) ,
3. Searching the balanced verification tree and retrieving results – similar complexity to the
size of the verification object, but less computationally expensive. Specifically, the depth
of the verification tree is decisive in the number of hashing and comparison operations that
need to occur. As such, the hash tree size can be evaluated as a min/max value (1) based on
the whether the leaves of the tree are full ( f entries) or in the worst case all half full ( f/2
entries).
Lea fmin = [n/ f ], Lea fmax = [2∗n/ f ] (1)
Based on these calculations we can evaluate the height of the tree (2) and (3).
Heightmin = [log f Lea fmin]+1 (2)
Heightmax = [log f/2Lea fmax]+1 (3)
So for a given n number of elements in the verification tree, there is an associated height
based on the number of leaves per branch f . This using the max height from (3) gives a
O(log f/2(2∗n/ f )) value for verification, where that number of hashes that will have to be
calculated and compared in addition to O(1) digital signatures operations. Additionally, the
efficiency improvements aim to decrease the height of the tree that needs to be retrieved and
evaluated, however as this is a dynamic process (and heavily reliant on usage patterns), it is
only evaluated in the implementation.
4.4 Experiment and Evaluation 87
4.3.4 Summary
In summary, this section detailed the methodology components that are utilized to provide
the required functionality as defined in the problem definition section. Data confidentiality
is addressed through the utilization of record encryption and searchable encryption. Query
assurance addressed through the use of an authenticated query assurance approach utilizing
variable timestamp values and placements. Efficient and secure storage addressed via our
evaluation of the scalability of the approach and will be further evaluated in the following
experiment and evaluation section.
4.4 Experiment and Evaluation
Our aim is to show the initial compatibility of authenticated query assurance combined
with searchable encryption in a single model, given its strong benefits for integrated public
health data repositories. In order to investigate the feasibility of our approach, our imple-
mentation uses relevant technologies and methods, and then measures the resulting metrics
relating to efficiency - in this case CPU time and data overhead. For a data format, we
chose to use XML records for our text based component of our data feasibility approach.
As XML files are a standardized format for the transfer of structured information between
data sources, acting as an interoperability layer that will likely be required between indi-
vidual public health information systems and HPSN mobile applications. Additionally, to
simulate the storage and retrieval of multimedia public health interventions, we utilized the
JSRT [20] digital image database. To provide breadth of database storage examples, we
utilized Apache Cassandra for the XML records due to its highly scalable nature and low
overheads, while the multimedia files were stored in a Microsoft SQL Server 2012 Enter-
prise edition database.
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Fig. 4.5 Experiment Architecture
4.4.1 Experiment Setup
The experiment setup was conducted on a x3 AMD 710 with 3GB RAM. The client and all
server implementations (verification, SQL and Cassandra) were run on the single machine.
The architecture used for the implementation is modeled in Figure 4.5. A key-value store
was used to store the encrypted XML records, in this case an Apache Cassandra database
running as a single node. A more typical SQL database (Microsoft SQL Server) was used
to store the encrypted multimedia data. The client and verification server were developed
in Java with 1.6.0 runtime library. The verification tree nodes were a custom class built
on top of the DefaultMutableTreeNode Java library. The tree follows a structure similar to
that of a B+ tree - that is, the tree is self-balancing and all records are stored in leaf nodes.
The experiment utilizes a single verification tree for both types of records; XML files and
multimedia data are hashed at the document level and inserted based on trapdoor encrypted
search term.
To perform the encryption of the data 128-bit AES specification was used. While a
combination of RSA encryption with a 1024 key length and SHA1 were used to provide the
hashing and digital signing of the verification tree.
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To provide a reasonable affinity to public health data in this experiment, we used a col-
lection of XML documents and a collection of high resolution digital images. The XML
records were created with example data. In total 100000 XML records were created and
encrypted then stored in a key-value database: Apache Cassandra. The approximate size of
the data stored in XML format is 1.9 GB. Before storing in the key-value database, the XML
records are encrypted using 128-bit AES, encoded into base64 then stored between CDATA
tags in XML format to avoid issues with unparsable XML records. The images were stored
in a Microsoft SQL Server 2012 database, in a blob (binary large object) format. The use of
a blob format allows for file storage with additional metadata that can also take advantage
of the security and reliability features of SQL databases including ACID (Atomicity, Con-
sistency, Isolation and Durability) properties. The JSRT image database is composed of 247
images. To further test the capabilities of this approach, we duplicated the images to create
2000 total stored images by appending unique header data prior to encryption, so that once
stored in the SQL database the records would appear unique. The storage process involved
reading the image data from each file, appending additional header information, followed
then by encrypting the binary data using 128-bit AES encryption and storing in the database
table.
Due to the nature of storing the XML records and multimedia data in an encrypted
format, only basic query functionality is available - in this case, index exact match and path
based queries. If required, the verification tree keyword encryption could be removed to
allow greater flexibility in search indexes/values.
4.5 Results
In our implementation, we measure the metrics of method execution time and data over-
head. In this section we will present our results. These metrics were chosen for this initial
evaluation as the goal is to demonstrate the feasibility and functioning of the novel query
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assurance method and also to demonstrate that there is not a significant execution time and
data overhead hit resulting from this approach, which at the same time has desirable proper-
ties for secure public health information systems. The results are organized into XML and
SQL queries, though the two data repositories share the same verification tree. Additionally,
for each dataset three blocks of queries were performed:
1. Initial block of 500000 XML data queries and 50000 SQL queries.
2. Repeat block of queries that perform the same set of queries as in the initial block
after the maintenance process had completed. This is used to assess the effectiveness
of the maintenance optimization in ideal circumstances.
3. Random block of queries that perform a random set of 50000 SQL data queries and
500000 XML data queries. This is used to demonstrate the effectiveness of optimiza-
tion even where the past usage trends are not indicative of future queries.
4.5.1 Computation Time
As shown in Fig. 4.6, the average SQL query time compared to the verification time was
similar. As such, the verification component of the over 50000 queries was not a major
issue, and if completed concurrently could be further minimized. However, the average ver-
ification time was higher than the XML data – despite operating from the same verification
tree. This is largely due to the increased hashing time related to the large file size of the
multimedia data – as after SQL data retrieval, it is hashed and compared to the retrieved
verification data. This also resulted in the maintenance optimization not being significant in
improving CPU times – as the majority of CPU time was spent in large hash operations and
SQL data retrieval.
We measured verification as being 54.4% of the total query time after maintenance op-
timization for the repeat data set, 54.4% for the random data set and 54.2% prior to opti-
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Fig. 4.6 SQL Query Average CPU Time
mization. The average query time over the 50000 queries performed during the pre and post
maintenance repeat and random rounds was 124ms, 141ms and 128ms respectively.
Alternatively, the XML query sets as shown in Fig. 4.7 had relatively higher verification
time compared to Cassandra data retrieval. This relates to the comparable size of data. In
general the query run did not show major improvement in average CPU time pre and post
maintenance.
We measured verification as being 47.7% of the total query time after maintenance op-
timization for the repeat data set, 52.88% for the random data set and 55.88% prior to
optimization. The average query time over the 500000 queries performed during the pre
and post maintenance repeat and random rounds was 1ms , .92ms and .97ms respectively.
Conversely, the verification tree initialization time was quite high. This is due to the
verification tree being built incrementally, as would often occur in a database as additional
data is stored. On average an insert in the verification tree took 28.99ms. This time is largely
accounted for by the branch node splits and re-balancing that occurs across the verification
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Fig. 4.7 XML Query Average CPU Time
tree. An unbalanced tree would ultimately be more efficient for inserts but less efficient for
queries.
Additionally, maintenance was a significant cause of CPU overhead, with an average
time of 25ms per verification leaf node. This is expected as the verification process includes
large changes to the verification tree including re-hashing and re-signing of nodes. The
maintenance operation could be further tweaked to provide a trade-off between data-owner
CPU time and improvements in client efficiency.
4.5.2 Query Data Overhead
As shown in Fig. 4.8, the verification data required to authenticate the retrieved SQL data
is minimal in relation to the SQL multimedia data. Approximately 0.018% of all data re-
trieved for the SQL queries was verification data pre-maintenance with that value dropping
to 0.011% for post-maintenance random queries and 0.005% for post-maintenance repeat
queries.
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Fig. 4.8 SQL Data and Verification Overhead
Fig. 4.9 SQL Verification Overhead Detail
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Fig. 4.10 XML Data and Verification Overhead
However, just comparing the verification data amount there was a signification decrease
brought about by the maintenance process as shown in Fig. 4.9. Verification data was 72%
of pre-maintenance levels even on the random query set, with the repeat query set resulting
in 40% of previous values over 50000 queries performed in each set.
The XML data results were similarly positive as shown in Fig. 4.10. Verification data
overhead was a much more significant component of overall data retrieved. With verification
data accounting for 11.95% of pre-maintenance data, 8.89% of random and 3.75% repeat
post-maintenance data. Verification data was 74% of pre-maintenance levels even on the
random query set, with the repeat query set resulting in 42% of previous values over 50000
queries performed in each set.
Overall, there was a significant decrease in verification data required post-maintenance,
with the most significant efficiencies gained where optimization can be based on repeating
historic trends.
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4.5.3 Results Discussion
Overall, the results show that the overhead cost of applying an authenticated query assurance
model with searchable encryption to public health data structures is not detrimentally high.
The data sets used for the implementation were XML records and multimedia data.
This provided a range of data types relevant to public health from the large file compo-
nents (multimedia) to the smaller XML files that could be used for data submission/public
health messaging dissemination. Additionally, our previous work [11] implemented a sim-
ilar query assurance methodology over a greater range of record sizes, and in that instance
data overhead was at acceptable levels and still significantly decreased by the maintenance
process.
The results show that query verification can be feasibly applied to public health informa-
tion data, with the actual time/data overhead being reasonable for querying against the data
set used in our implementation. Further, the application of optimization to the verification
tree can have positive effects to both computational time and data overhead, even where
there is no query trend apparent.
In comparison, the insert time for verification nodes remains expensive and in some
cases the verification tree may need to be optimized to reduce it. Increasing the number of
child nodes per branch or requiring less strict tree balancing may have a positive outcome if
this is required. Ultimately, due to the characteristics of this approach, its feasibility for the
performance requirements of a particular system would need to be considered. However,
we considered that it performs within acceptable levels of overheads in most cases.
Additionally, though we found that verification of larger multimedia files required addi-
tional verification time. However, compared to the additional time of data retrieval of large
files the verification overhead was not overly significant.
We found the maintenance operation to be quite time consuming on a similar scale to
the initial verification tree initialization, when applied to a dataset of this size with the
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high number of queries performed against it. Any implementation of this type of approach
would need to consider the improvement through optimization against the data-owners own
computation time in performing the maintenance.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Work
This work explored the area of providing query assurance and security over encrypted public
health information stored in shared or distributed databases. This will become an increas-
ingly important capability for assured records as electronic health records constituted from
multiple underlying repositories, including participant repositories in HPSNs become more
extensively used and increasingly essential. We investigated whether a high level of query
assurance could be feasibly provided in these conditions while maintaining reasonable over-
heads.
A test implementation was developed to measure the feasibility and efficiency of our
approach, with specific consideration given to time and data overheads. We found that the
overheads were not a major component of providing this type of implementation. Further, it
was shown that our verification tree optimization technique was effective in reducing time
overheads in our XML dataset and data verification overhead in both XML and multimedia
datasets. However, some parts of the implementation continue to be moderately expensive:
tree initialization, maintenance and insertion.
The use of a keyword trapdoor allowed the implementation to perform basic queries on
the encrypted data, while preserving the confidentiality of both the keyword and stored data.
The implementation provides an authenticated level of query assurance. Additionally,
as the records are encrypted and stored in an easily transmissible format, the approach is
applicable to a range of different public health record types, such as data submissions or
public health interventions.
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5 PRIVACY THRESHOLD APPROACH TO HPSN DATA AG-
GREGATION AND COLLECTION
Preamble
This chapter extends on a journal paper that was accepted in the Journal of the Association
for Information Science and Technology [1]. It has been included as a chapter of this thesis
with some additional detail added to subsection 5.5.1 and an additional subsection added
5.5.4 in addition to minor formatting changes to align with the thesis format. As part of
preparing the paper for the thesis format the related work section has been moved to Chapter
2 . The previous chapter was focused on the implementation/evaluation of the distribution
components of the system. This chapter is the second implementation/evaluation chapter
and focuses on a local processing privacy threshold approach to public health data aggrega-
tion : expanding on the architecture introduced in chapter 3 detailing the major components
of the systems. Further, additional detail on the types of sensors and sensor capabilities cur-
rently available/being developed that could be used as part of a health participatory sensing
network are also discussed.
This chapter’s technical and implementation/evaluation component is focused on a pri-
vacy threshold approach to public health data aggregation. This provides a specific approach
to the requirement first detailed in 3.3.3. This approach uses a quasi-identifier score (QIS)
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and multiple tiered thresholds to ascertain a specific level of data contribution and reduce
privacy risks. This process is discussed at length with an algorithm provided. Additionally,
further discussion of the types of data submission components and methods to ascertain
their relative QIS value is presented.
These components are then utilized to build and evaluate a prototype implementation of
a threshold privacy approach.
ABSTRACT
The pervasive availability and increasingly sophisticated functionalities of smartphones and
their connected external sensors or wearable devices can provide a new data collection capa-
bility relevant to public health. Current research and commercial efforts have concentrated
on sensor-based collection of health data for personal fitness and personal healthcare feed-
back purposes. However, to date there has not been a detailed investigation of how such
smartphones and sensors can be utilized for public health data collection purposes.
Unlike most sensing applications, in the case of public health, capturing comprehensive
and detailed data is not a necessity, but rather aggregate data alone is in many cases suffi-
cient for public health purposes. As such, public health data has the characteristic of being
capturable whilst still not infringing privacy, as the full detailed data of individuals that may
allow re-identification is not needed, but rather only aggregate, de-identified and non-unique
data for an individual. For example, rather than details of physical activity including spe-
cific route, just total caloric burn over a week or month could be submitted, thereby not
identifying the individual.
In this chapter we introduce, prototype and evaluate a new type of public health in-
formation system to provide aggregate population health data capture and public health
informational or behavioral intervention capabilities via utilizing smartphone and sensor
capabilities, whilst fully maintaining the anonymity and privacy of each individual. We
consider in particular the key aspects of privacy, anonymity and intervention capabilities
of these emerging systems and carry out a detailed evaluation of anonymity preservation
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characteristics.
5.1 Introduction
The recent rapid growth in both the capabilities and uptake of smartphones, suitable to act as
health sensor platforms, has the potential to advance public health data collection and inter-
vention in significant ways. Whilst increasingly research and development is concentrating
on how mobile devices and sensors can be used as a tool for individual health data capture
and feedback, this has not extended into investigation of how these devices can be used for
public health data capture. Interestingly, the case for public health usage doesn’t require the
same level of precise data that would often be required in participatory sensing [2] applica-
tions in other domains. For example, the exact location and time of a measured sensor value
is less important than the aggregate value over a period of time or the trend or change for a
community as a whole.
This chapter is a significantly extended version of a previous conference paper [3]. In
particular this chapter differs in that it analyzes these novel smartphone-based public health
information systems as a generic new type of system. It describes the results from building
a significant prototype system and carries out a substantially more detailed privacy and
anonymity analysis. We describe a class of smartphone-based information systems for
anonymized public health data capture and intervention. Interventions [4], in this work
are in the form of informational or behavior-related messages sent to an individual’s smart-
phone, intended to create a health-related behavioral change, and are a key component of
future Health Participatory Sensing Networks (HPSNs). In particular, as we later describe, a
significant new capability enabled by these systems is that a targeted public health interven-
tion can be distributed, performed and evaluated without the need for the identifying details
of an individual to ever leave their mobile device.
The introduced system eschews the need for a fully trusted central server, which might
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prove impractical or a significant privacy risk on population-scale applications. Instead
adopting an architecture which has a central aggregation server in communication with the
end-user mobile devices, only via an intervening anonymizing layer, and uses local process-
ing on each mobile device to ensure non-re-identifiability of the user from their submitted
sensor data.
The anonymous communications layer could utilize onion routing [5] or mix networks [6]
which are techniques for anonymous communication over a computer network using mul-
tiple intermediate nodes and encryption to protect privacy – these networks make it hard
to trace the source and destination of an end-to-end communication. The system uses an
anonymizing layer in combination with de-identification of data submitted, such that the
content of the data submitted does not identify an individual, thus allowing anonymous sub-
mission/interaction between the participant and the HPSN. Beyond de-identification, the
approach also addresses the risk of re-identification based on quasi-identifiers, such as in-
formation known about individuals outside the HPSN that could potentially be used to match
with and re-identify the submitting individual. The conventional approach to addressing this
type of risk, is to use a trusted server or aggregation point to combine and obfuscate/alter
data to the point where k-anonymity [7] is assured for a data set, such that any individual is
indiscernible from k other records based on quasi-identifiers.
However the type of public health information system introduced in this chapter, instead
performs de-identification without a trusted aggregator or server, which significantly re-
duces privacy risks as there is no central point where sensitive information is stored that can
itself pose a privacy threat to participants, or become a site for security lapses or target of
malicious activity. Rather, anonymity and non-re-identifiability can be provided by firstly,
locally processing collected data on the user’s mobile device into an aggregated, generalized
form that can still meet the desired public health data collection purposes. This is achieved
in the system by utilizing quasi-identifier scores (QISs) as a quantified measurement of
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approximate risk of possible re-identification and thereby enables a threshold approach to
privacy limits. The threshold approach allows for automated, on-device calculation of the
quantified privacy/re-identification risk of submitting various levels of detailed health sensor
information in terms of QISs. The threshold approach supports the use of standard or default
thresholds in terms of QISs as well as modification of thresholds on an individual’s device
to suit the preferences of a given individual. This allows the level of privacy disclosure an
individual agrees to, to be managed without requiring a case-by-case approval.
5.2 Sensor Capabilities and Public Health Measures
In this section, we describe how data relevant to many public health measures can already
be captured automatically via current or commercially available sensor capabilities. By
measures we mean items that are indicators of health or healthy lifestyle or disease risk
or disease. That is, the use of sensors for public health relevant data is not a speculative
proposal, as many current commercial sensors already provide relevant functionalities.
We discuss this by first considering various current commercial sensor capabilities and
then matching these to various accepted health risk factors, such as physical activity, blood
pressure, blood glucose levels, weight etc.
5.2.1 Sensor Capabilities
The proliferation of commercial fitness and health sensors provides new mechanisms for
population health data capture, even though these are currently targeted for use in relation
to an individual’s health and fitness. Commercially available sensors are also already able
to capture many biomedical measures collected in public health data surveys. Such sensors
include wearable patches, stretchable electronic tattoos, smartwatches, other wearables and
implantable sensors along with the more widely deployed smartphones and connected sen-
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sors. In addition, such public health data capture would have a number of characteristics
quite distinct from traditional survey-based public health data capture approaches. These
include:
• Being real-time/ near real-time
• Larger participant numbers/ proportion of population
• More detailed data
• Captured electronically
• Direct measurement, not human response
• Anonymized, as we discuss in this work
The area of personal health sensor and software development and commercialization [8]
is currently a highly active area. This is possibly due to the relevance of these individual sen-
sors to both the rapidly developing smartphone market and technologies, and the increasing
interest to leverage such technologies for personal wellness, fitness, health and healthcare
purposes [9, 10].
Fitness and Physical Activity Sensors
Commercial implementations such as Nike Fuel and Jawbone Up demonstrate the potential
for, and achievability of continuous physical activity sensing. Jawbone Up extends beyond
physical activity monitoring to include sleep patterns, sleep quality, and a nutritional diary.
Other well-known examples of such wearable sensors include; FitBit, RunKeeper, myFit-
nessPal, Pebble Watch, the Basis Watch and Google Glass. Such fitness and health sensors
are the most contemporarily available type of sensor that can be utilized for public health
purposes, because such sensors are already achieving widespread interest and a great level
of mass adoption.
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Also of significant relevance is Google Now’s, Activity Summary [11] which automat-
ically provides a monthly estimate of how far an individual has walked and cycled, and
comes as part of Google’s Android mobile operating system – hence is already extremely
widely deployed.
Vital Signs Sensors
Smartwatches such as the Mio Active are able to capture heart rate, the Amiigo wristband
captures blood oxygen levels, Somaxis provides ECG and EMG sensors and the mc10
stretchable electronic tattoo can transmit heart rate and brain activity [8]. The capturing
of vital signs is often more beneficial for individual health care, but it also adds new capa-
bilities for public health data systems. Another example, the Sense A/S monitoring patch is
able to measure blood pressure [8].
Blood Constituent Sensors
Increasingly, there are wireless-enabled patch technologies emerging that may be able to
capture the levels of some blood constituents. Examples include the forthcoming Sano
Intelligence [12] wearable patch which is touted to allow the capture of blood glucose and
potassium levels, with further blood constituent capture planned for the future. Numerous
continuous blood glucose monitoring systems are also currently available, mainly targeted
for the management of diabetes.
Such sensor capabilities in a cheap and accurate form, have the potential to revolutionize
individual health care, early detection and preventative health; and by extension also public
health. That is, because such capabilities may be so beneficial in terms of individual health
monitoring, health maintenance and early detection, that they could achieve wide adoption.
If so, their possible role in public health data capture can also be proportionately significant.
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Ambient sensors
Other initiatives such as Riderlog [13] and the Copenhagen Wheel [14] are moving towards
capturing physical activity levels, and at the same time, additional contextual and envi-
ronmental data. The Copenhagen wheel goes beyond physical activity sensing, to urban
environment monitoring with air quality and noise sensors included in the implementation
to provide additional data beyond just the activity of the individual.
5.2.2 Public Health Risk Factors
The various types of health data that can be collected via the above-mentioned sensors,
already relate to a majority of public health measures:
• Physical Activity Levels – This is one of the most important lifestyle factors for
chronic health conditions, other health risks and health in general [15]. This can
now be quite accurately captured with already commercially available sensors and
even via in-built smartphone capabilities alone [11].
• Caloric Burn and Caloric Intake – Caloric burn information can be captured by a
range of activity sensors as described, and caloric intake can also be increasingly
automatically captured [16].
• Nutritional Data – As mentioned, wearable patches have the ability to measure potas-
sium levels, one of the markers of nutrition status [17].
• Blood Pressure – Blood pressure is a public health marker of cardiovascular dis-
ease [17] which is one of the most significant morbidity and mortality risks. As
described, blood pressure can be captured via a wearable patch such as the Sense
A/S amongst numerous others.
110 Privacy Threshold Approach to HPSN Data Aggregation and Collection
• Blood Glucose – A marker of diabetes [17] can be captured by wearable patches and
other continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) devices. Recently the use of wirelessly
connected contact lenses for measuring blood glucose levels from the surface of the
eye has also been described [18].
• Body Mass Index (BMI) – Height is roughly invariant for adults and Bluetooth-
enabled scales are increasingly available to capture weight.
• Body Fat Percentage and Lean Mass – Consumer grade scales and other measurement
devices include body fat percentage and lean mass and wireless-enabled scales are
increasingly available to capture these details.
• Sleep Pattern and Regularity – Sleep patterns are both an indicator and a preventa-
tive/risk factor for a number of conditions. Sleep quality can be captured by currently
available commercial wristbands and other sensors.
5.3 Public Health Information System Architecture
The overall public health information system architecture (Figure 5.1) involves one or many
central Health Participatory Sensing Servers (HPSSs) that communicate with mobile devices
through a mix network or onion routing network to provide communications anonymity, and
mobile devices that incorporate local processing and privacy thresholds to maintain data
anonymity/privacy/de-identification.
The same HPSN and HPSS could be utilized by multiple health organizations (Public
Health Groups) i.e. organizations involved in public health-related activities. The HPSN in-
terfaces with Public Health Groups, which could include state or federal health departments,
public health research institutions or other public health organizations.
There are two primary data transmissions from and to the HPSS respectively: (1) data
requests and public health interventions are distributed from the HPSS; and (2) anonymized
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Fig. 5.1 Public Health Information System Architecture
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data collection submissions are sent to the HPSS. The core functionality components of
the HPSS are (1) Data Aggregation, (2) Analysis, (3) Intervention/Data Requests and (4)
Administration.
The fundamental architecture can support different levels of both data collection and
optionally public health intervention, depending largely on the capabilities of the end-user
mobile devices as well as the level of participation in the public health data collection task
of the individual users of these devices. We introduce these configurations in the following
subsections.
5.3.1 Smartphone With or Without External Sensors
This is the base-case of a user utilizing a smartphone with or without additional external
sensors, where the user is not required to take additional actions to participate in the public
health data capture. This configuration has the advantage in that it has the greatest level
of existing hardware deployment and ease of adoption – that is, smartphones without addi-
tional external sensors are currently the most prolific smartphone deployment case, though
external sensors are increasing in popularity. Various types of data can prove to be impor-
tant public health or epidemiological data sources. An example would be physical activity
tracking [19] which has become increasing popular in recent years, as well as its potential
secondary usage for smart cities, including use for public health and population data capture
and urban planning and environmental monitoring as discussed in our previous work [20].
5.3.2 Intervention Capabilities
This configuration additionally provides inputs to the individual to alter the actions they
would have taken whilst participating in the HPSN, in addition to the sensing capabilities
arising from smartphones, with or without additional external sensors. Such participatory
sensing in the health context has a somewhat different goal to that of ‘active’ participa-
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tory sensing in many other contexts. Whilst an ‘active’ participatory sensing model for a
typical sensing task might focus on achieving more complete data collection in terms of
spatial/temporal range, health and epidemiological-related active sensing would be more
concerned with affecting a health-impacting behavior and hence have a component equat-
ing to a public health intervention. As such, the instigation to carry out ‘active’ sensing
activities essentially constitutes a public health intervention input. Additionally for public
health purposes, this can allow for immediate and continuous feedback of the effectiveness
of campaigns upon population groups and sub-groups – a powerful new capability. This
can contribute to the further understanding of the effect of informational inputs on such
health-related behavior change as exercise behavior change [21] and for many other public
health-related behavioral change campaigns.
5.3.3 Extension via Manual Input
This configuration combines the potential sensing capabilities of smartphones and exter-
nal sensors with additional ‘human-sensing’ capabilities, allowing for larger volumes of
sensor-based data to be complemented with subjective human-generated data and feedback.
Further, this configuration can be implemented with or without intervention capabilities.
Even without the benefits of interventions, the motivation for contributing data could be
self-monitoring or altruistic/ citizen-scientist contribution, with the combination allowing
the additional capability of providing human feedback in regards to interventions.
This is implemented through the addition of context-sensitive micro-surveys that are
requested to be filled by users and attached to relevant collected sensor data. This allows
for both data that is difficult to record through sensors alone, such as the context or purpose
of physical activity (work, transport or recreation) and in some cases, data that may have
been missed perhaps due to not wearing the sensors/mobile device for a period of time, to
be added to the overall collection.
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5.4 System and Prototype Components
The public health information system includes four major components: the HPSS, network
layer, anonymizing layer and user mobile device. These architectural components and de-
tails of their prototype characteristics are described here.
5.4.1 Health Participatory Sensing Server
The HPSS provides the central component of the public health sensing system. In this
section we will describe its key modules, which are: (1) the data requests/interventions
module; (2) the data aggregation module; and (3) the analysis module.
Firstly, the data requests/ interventions module on the HPSN server addresses the send-
ing of data requests or interventions to end-user mobile devices, but through the intermedi-
ary of the anonymizing layer.
Secondly, the data aggregation module receives incoming sensing data, but once again
via the intermediary anonymizing layer.
As the public health information system incorporates submissions of variable resolution
(that is submissions for the same public health data collection task can provide more or less
detail), the aggregation module primarily works to integrate this data and provide any data
cleansing as necessary.
For the minimum resolution of data, the aggregation is straightforward as the more de-
tailed submissions are just summarized to the same level. However, for analysis of lower
resolution data, where drilldown or greater detail is required, the lower resolution data can
either be excluded or extrapolated based on more precise data of other submissions and an
approximation approach utilized. Additionally, there are the additional data components,
which can be optional that is not required for submission or mandatory components that
must be part of the submission (see ‘Data submission policies’ subsection). Where a com-
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ponent has not been submitted for analysis either the data can be excluded or populated
based on statistical averages and an approximation model. Thirdly, the analysis module cal-
culates metrics of interest for public health analysis by the Public Health Groups from the
received sensing data.
5.4.2 Network and Anonymizing Layers
The network layer supports communication between the HPSS and the onion routing net-
work (or mix network).
This layer also carries the data submissions from the onion routing network to the HPSS
and the data submission policies/public health interventions from the HPSS to the onion
routing network, to then be delivered onwards to the distributed HPSN data nodes (see
‘Intervention capabilities’ subsection).
The Anonymizing Layer consists of a mix network [6] or onion network [5], which pro-
vides for anonymity of the submitter, as well as secure communication. Such approaches
utilize a chain of proxy servers between the participant and HPSS, which can provide
anonymity for both parties, though in this case it is only required for the mobile device
user. Though this creates additional implementation complexity, the potential benefit to real
privacy is significant, with the only remaining significant privacy threat being the content of
the data submitted allowing identification or re-identification.
In this system these proxy servers are referred to as HPSN data nodes.
The primary limitation of anonymous submission is that it reduces the practicality of
detecting and removing invalid or purposefully erroneous data, as there is no history of
submissions attached to an individual participant.
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5.4.3 User Mobile Device
Software incorporating the following modules is present on the end user’s mobile device.
The user’s mobile device can operate according to the different levels of configuration iden-
tified in the ‘Public health information system architecture’ section. This would depend
upon end user choices such as: the external health sensors they have chosen to use, if any;
their willingness to receive occasional micro-surveys, if any; and their willingness, if any,
to participate in and receive public health intervention information. This level of choice
would be manifested at both the application level – that is, an overall opt-in or out of data
collection, health interventions and micro-surveys, as well as allowing controls over spe-
cific Public Health Group interactions. This could allow the user to opt-in for example to
health interventions from one health organization on a specific topic and opt-in to just data
submission with a second health organization. In this section we will describe the three
key modules of the user mobile device: (1) On-device communication module; (2) Local
processing module; and (3) Sensor interface module
Firstly, the on-device communication module interfaces with the onion routing network.
However, to complement this privacy approach, the on-device communications module op-
erates entirely on a pull approach through the distributed HPSN data nodes for requesting
new data submission polices and public health interventions. This is because a push-based
approach could be used to selectively distribute narrow policies for short periods of time
that could potentially impact on re-identification privacy.
As such, distributed policies have associated distribution timestamps (period after which
the policy should no longer be distributed) and expiry timestamps (period whereby the pol-
icy should no longer be used on the local device, and needs to be replaced). The on-device
communication module checks the distribution timestamp on receipt of new data submis-
sion policies/public health interventions, and if it has passed, these can be discarded. A
similar approach is taken with expiry timestamps, an expired policy/intervention should be
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discarded, and no longer used on the local device as well as be replaced.
The other capability of the on-device communications module, is the submission of
aggregate de-identified anonymized data. The preparation of this data is handled by the
local processing module with the on-device communication module packaging the data for
submission through the onion routing network.
Secondly, in relation to the local processing module, the section ‘Privacy threshold ap-
proach to public health data aggregation‘, describes the local processing provided by this
module.
Thirdly, the sensor interface module incorporates all capabilities required to support
integration of on-device sensors, external sensors and environmental sensors that may con-
tribute to data collection. This module can make use of existing communications standards
such as the ISO/IEEE 11073 Personal Health Data standard to carry out standardized inter-
facing with external sensors where such standards are adopted.
5.4.4 Public Health Groups
Multiple public health groups are able to utilize the same HPSS and HPSN.
An end user might subscribe to more than one public health group’s public health data
collection or intervention policy. For example, an individual could subscribe to data col-
lection by two public health groups: the Department of Health and an Active Transport
Initiative. They could for example, also subscribe to receipt of micro-surveys from the
Active Transport Initiative and health interventions from the Department of Health.
The subscribed to policies, micro-surveys and health interventions would be updated
periodically by these Public Health Groups. This is controlled by the client checking for
updates, with the maximum valid period of a set of policies set by an expiring timestamp,
one referring to the distribution process (maximum time before the data should no longer be
distributed) and a second referring to the expected validity period (maximum period before
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the policy needs to be updated).
Throughout an individual’s daily schedule, their mobile device would automatically col-
lect physical activity data, and data relevant to each organization is submitted intermittently
throughout the day, utilizing the privacy-preserving mechanisms of the HPSN. The HPSN
maintains user anonymity and does not allow re-identification – the submitted data just pro-
vides valuable input when combined with the mass of other individual’s data, for aggregate
population health measures.
For example, the Department of Health could be interested in overall physical activity
in a day with age bracket and coarse location or location type information also submitted.
Alternatively, the Active Transport Initiative might only be concerned with physical activity
related to transportation (e.g. walking/cycling commuting) with the additional data of age
bracket and start ‘coarse location’ and end ‘coarse location’ submitted. As another example,
infrequently the end user might be prompted to complete a micro-survey related to active
transport. For example, this could be a 30 second survey asking for a ranking of the five
most significant factors as to whether on a specific day the individual would cycle/walk to
work. This micro-survey would be presented to an end-user based on the locally stored data
relating to that individual’s travel habits – although it would have been sent to a much larger
group. The end user’s preferences also restrict how often micro-surveys from individual
organizations and the overall HPSN system can request micro-surveys.
For example based on personal preferences and previous trend data, the end-user could
also be prompted by a health intervention from the Department of Health, suggesting the
health benefits of cycling.
The end user might also be interested to track their own health-related data and could
find this a benefit that also assists their motivation to participate in the HPSN. The data
displayed to them for this purpose is kept securely on their own device under their personal
control (assuming that the mobile device includes its own security/anti-virus measures). The
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data is never exposed via transmission to the HPSN, but this detailed data can separately be
fed into such systems as part of their portable Personal Health Record [22] - for this reason
this data for self-use can be more detailed and can be viewed without aggregation processing
having first occurred if desired.
5.5 Privacy Threshold Approach to Public Health Data Ag-
gregation
The public health information system, by applying granular and modular restrictions upon
data collection controlled by the user, reduces real privacy risks through high levels of user
control of contribution and restrictions on data potentially usable for re-identification. Addi-
tionally, the use of a local processing approach [23] to data submission and health interven-
tion policies, allows the on-device adaptation to achieve a data submission which matches
the data request as closely as possible without breaching variable user defined privacy con-
ditions. This approach to privacy thresholds encourages the request of summary, calculated,
classified and grouped data, rather than individually specific raw data, that would be likely
to pose a privacy risk through potentially allowing re-identification.
In this section we will define the overall data aggregation model, the core types of data
submission components, a data submission policy approach that allows prioritization of
measures/components for submission adaption and a privacy threshold structure against
which to evaluate the requests.
5.5.1 Data Submission Components
The core concept of local processing (on the user mobile device) of health data for anonymized
submission requires that individual components of a data submission have an associated
quasi-identifier score (QIS). Additionally, as the components are made more generalized,
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such as for example, a submission including the city of submission rather than a specific zip
code or postcode, the QIS would be lower to reflect the increased generality. The approach
also takes into account the case where multiple quasi-identifiers are submitted together, as
such a group of quasi-identifiers will have a combined QIS value, that is assessed against
privacy thresholds. The four core data components in determining the combined QIS are:
Measures, Location, Temporal and Demographic and are described below.
Measures are aggregate or calculated values that refer to a specific health-related value
to be collected. A data collection can have multiple measures for comparison. Examples of
possible population-wide anonymized health or wellness measures are discussed in our pre-
vious work [24] and include values such as physical activity patterns and intensity, caloric
burn and caloric intake, nutritional data, BMI and sleep regularity and patterns - however,
this is not an exhaustive list, and rather just representative of contemporary sensing capa-
bilities. Emerging wearable patches that may be able to capture some blood constituent
information [25], future lab-on-a-chip technologies, smartwatches and wirelessly-enabled
‘tattoos’, all portend to significantly extend the capabilities of the proposed smartphone-
based population health data capture system.
Location is a pivotal component - the place a measure occurred can be of material rele-
vance to public health. Although fine-grained location information would not be generally
required for public health, some examples include places physical activity occurred as a lo-
cation type (e.g. work, home, gym or parks), active transport data (where physical activity
is combined with commuting/ transportation) etc. A fine location resolution would have a
high QIS score, whilst a more general location would have a lower QIS score.
The Temporal component indicates the time or interval of time in which a measure
occurred. Rather than submitting the specific time of a measure, a time period in which the
measured value occurred can be submitted, lowering the potential risk of re-identification.
Additionally, to keep the QIS value low, keeping the temporal value of the returned result
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less precise is preferred.
The demographic component includes all the other data about the participant that may
be additionally submitted for data analysis for example gender, age, ethnicity etc.
5.5.2 Data Submission Policies
Data submission policies will have:
1. Mandatory data requirements – Typically a Measure value and high priority demo-
graphic dimensions. If this is not submittable without breaching an individual’s pri-
vacy threshold the submission is not made for that individual.
2. Optional data requirements – Additional data components that can be submitted along-
side the mandatory data requirements. To allow for the calculation of the highest level
of data that can be submitted without breaching the threshold, the optional data com-
ponents will be weighted by importance and whether a less specific data submission
is acceptable for a data component as a secondary weighting.
An algorithm (see ‘Algorithm for data collection policy processing’ subsection) will
calculate the inclusion of data components versus the resolution (the detail) of data to create
the most suitable data submission (based on weightings) that can be achieved. This will
allow beyond the inclusion decision, the level of detail that is submitted to also be adjusted.
e.g. for time data, reducing the resolution down to a larger time period, rather than an exact
time, could avoid a location/time threshold limit, as well as, lowering the overall submission
QIS to meet the overall threshold allowing for more detailed data for other data components.
Additionally, as shown in Figure 5.2 a tree-based approach to the privacy threshold struc-
ture is utilized, where all lower level thresholds as well as the overall threshold cannot be
exceeded by a data submission QIS. Apart from the threshold related to the data components
we identified in the previous subsection, there are the additional thresholds of ‘Historic’ and
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Fig. 5.2 Algorithm for Data Collection Policy Processing
‘Custom User Defined’. Historic relates to a limitation as to how often and how many times
a mobile device will submit similar data (typically based on the same measure for a spe-
cific temporal range) to a given data requester or to all requesters generally. Finally, the
user defined threshold allows for the limitation of certain contexts, such as not reporting on
measures in certain locations, or time periods or combinations of data components that they
would like to restrict in addition to the standard thresholds.
The data request is processed by the local processing module by adapting the data sub-
mission request to the anonymous submission settings on the local device. Firstly (Fig-
ure 5.3), it is confirmed that the required minimum data can be submitted (data components
with an inclusion weighting greater than the required inclusion threshold), at the minimal
level of precision, without exceeding any privacy constraints.
Secondly, the level of precision of the required minimum data is increased based on the
resolution rating up to the level that the maximum precision or privacy threshold is met.
Thirdly, if there is additional QIS margin to the threshold at this point, optional data
components are included. The inclusion of the optional components is calculated based on
the inclusion weighting and precision weighting giving an optimal inclusion structure. This
approach is performed for all the lower level thresholds of the privacy threshold structure
individually, then adjusted to meet and balance at the parent node threshold, then adjusted
to meet the root threshold and re-balanced. This process is illustrated in Figure 5.3.
This provides for a personalized adjustment of the submission requirement to meet the
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Fig. 5.3 Data Collection Rule Processing Algorithm
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previously described privacy rules on specific data or overall data components. This fa-
cilitates an easy to manage system of user-level privacy control that does not remove the
usefulness of the data for public health data collection.
5.6 Privacy
The goals of a HPSN are of a different nature than those of other such participatory sensing
networks that for example provide noise maps [26] or air quality data [27]. Rather, the goal
is to collect aggregate population-scale health data and deliver public health interventions.
5.6.1 Location
While exact GPS location information is typically used as a component for on-device calcu-
lation of physical activity, essentially, all of this location information can be dispensed with
before submission to the public health data system. For example, while the on-device data
shows that an individual cycled 50km along a particular route between town A and town B,
the aggregate data to be submitted for this event can be simply the physical activity level
or caloric burn of cycling 50km rather than the distance and locations (or alternatively the
distance in combination with conditions i.e. elevation, wind, pace intensity etc. could be
submitted). This is because it is overall physical activity levels or alternately sedentary be-
havior levels that are of interest in relation to public health. By submitting only the caloric
burn arising from 50km of cycling, the re-identification level can be shown to be close to
zero. This is because the measure (caloric burn of 50km cycling), location and temporal
details are unlikely to be statistically unique. For example, in Australia which has a fairly
low cycling participation rate compared to the international community, in an average week
3.6 million Australians (18% of the population) [28] use a bicycle for transport of recre-
ation. Though this is more or less common based on particular demographic groups, with
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that scale, it is unlikely that an individual contribution would be statistically unique. Addi-
tionally, using the known demographic distributions from previous research, the submission
can be adapted to minimize the re-identification risk for all individuals, such as rarer demo-
graphics (see analysis in Section ‘Evaluation’).
An additional way that location data could be used in public health data collection is
through location classification. That is, rather than submitting the coarse or fine grained
location data, the type of location is instead submitted. This could incorporate reporting
that a measure is linked to a work or home location (without revealing the location of ei-
ther), or for example, for physical activity that it is linked to a park, gym, trail/track, urban
street etc. Similar classifications would be possible for many types of measures collected
for public health, and the privacy advantage of processing that classification locally rather
than submitting sensitive data is significant. In the case of location classification, individ-
ual classifications are unlikely to be used to re-identify an individual. However, it would
be reasonable to apply a threshold on the number of locations submitted to avoid potential
exploitation. An example of such exploitation might be where an individual could be poten-
tially re-identified due to having a unique set of locations for a given demographic set that
can be correlated with known external data, perhaps from social media.
An example of adaptive local processing of location privacy is demonstrated in previous
work [29]. However, as public health data submission does not require location data at all
for many submissions, this means the approach can be shown to provide complete location
privacy at the most conservative privacy setting. However, though not required for the core
purpose of public health data collection, there are niche analyses that could benefit from
more detailed location information which would operate on a privacy threshold approach.
A simple calculation such as below could be used.
LQIS = 1/d ∗λ (1)
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In the above formula d is the population density of the area and λ is the location resolu-
tion.
5.6.2 Temporal
While a participatory network seeking to capture food intake, might in theory involve cap-
turing this information per meal and submitting this, for the purposes of public health data
capture, such time-specific data is not required. For example, simply submitting the aggre-
gate nutritional intake for a week may be more than sufficient for public health measures,
and significantly more detailed than provided by current public health data approaches.
Knowing more specific details of the time in which a measure occurred can be consid-
ered to affect risks of re-identification. As such, we identify the following characteristics of
a temporal period to be considered in terms of calculating its QIS:
• Length (L) – The duration of the time period. Longer periods will have a higher num-
ber of potential submissions and as such are less likely to result in re-identification.
• Granules (G) – Is it possible to break the total period (and the associated measure)
into its component parts and at what resolution.
• Start time (S) – Whether the start time is standard or targeted (standard would im-
ply typical data submission breakdowns such as start of day, start of week, morning,
evening, night etc.) e.g. 00:00am or 9:15am
• End time (E) – Whether the end time is standard or targeted e.g. 23:59pm or 9:33am
As such we use the following formula to calculate the Temporal QIS:
TQIS = Tcalc(S,E)+L/(1−G) (2)
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In the above formula Tcalc evaluates the start and end time of the data submission request,
where the start and end date are related to common time periods e.g. day, week, month,
quarter etc. a set value is used relative to the broad or narrow nature of the period. Where
the start or end time is more targeted, an additional weighting is added to the most closely
matching set value for a common period.
5.6.3 Demographics
In public health data capture systems, the types of demographic data needed such as age
or age range, gender, major ethnicities, city or zip/postcode are typically non-identifying as
long as they represent a large enough share of the population. The population demograph-
ics of regions and countries are already collected for public planning and research due to
collection of census data or similar large scale data collections giving us good baseline data
for demographic thresholds. Additionally, in some cases averages are known for specific
activities that may be used in measures, such as the cycling example discussed in relation
to the Location component [28]. As such, based on this existing data, the probability of a
combination of demographics can be calculated and compared against a privacy threshold
setting. Such as in the formula below where µ is the individual demographic details.
DQIS = 1−Pr(µ1,µ2,µ3, . . . ,µn) (3)
5.6.4 Measures
The identifiability arising from specific measures, can be decreased to near zero simply by
decreasing the location and temporal resolution as described above. Additionally, in most
public health data submissions that do not require specific location or temporal details, the
only potentially privileged data that would be at risk is the measure value. Therefore, if
re-identification is achieved through external knowledge of an individual’s measure value,
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no actual leak of information has occurred.
However, in cases of multiple measures in a single submission, though unlikely it would
be possible that one measure could provide re-identification and exposure of an additional
measure. As such, it is required to impose a threshold on the measure component of the
submission, which can require obfuscation or exclusion of measures from the submission.
MQIS = ωAA1+ωBB2+ωCC3+ . . . +ωDDn (4)
In the above formula A, B, C and D are individual measures and ω is the resolution for
the measure. This reduces the above identified risk by limiting the number and detail of
additional measures on a submission.
5.6.5 Public Health Interventions and Feedback
Although other participatory sensing applications do not have a public health intervention
component, parallels can be drawn between some interventions and participatory sensing
that involves tasking, that is, assigning specific sensing ‘tasks’ to individuals. The use
of targeted or personalized tasks/interventions would usually involve the HPSS knowing
enough detail about the individual to provide this capability. However, to provide a higher
level of privacy, targeting/personalization can be performed on the local device based on the
much more specific detail available there. Additionally, the use of an onion routing network
restricts the risk of the HPSS being aware of which individual mobile devices have received
particular interventions.
After interventions are performed on a mobile device, feedback regarding the effective-
ness and suitability of the intervention would be required for public health program refine-
ment. For example, for a specific public health campaign, it may be necessary to know
which interventions were initiated, and what effect they had on an individual over a 3 month
period. As with other data submissions, the type of intervention and the metrics of success
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can be considered the ‘measure’ and the other details, the additional data components. The
same approach can be taken in regard to privacy thresholds to ensure that whilst a very spe-
cific intervention can be issued, it is not reported as the specific intervention type, if to do
so would violate a privacy threshold.
5.6.6 Overall Threshold
The overall threshold is calculated by combining the LQIS, TQIS, DQIS and MQIS in two
stages, where there is a first stage threshold over LQIS and TQIS as there are close connections
between location and temporal privacy and a second stage over all QIS values.
Stage 1:
θL/T > γLLQIS+ γT TQIS (5)
Stage 2:
θLT DM > γLTθL/T + γDDQIS+ γMMQIS (6)
In the above formulae θx refers to the threshold for x and γy refers to the weighting on
individual thresholds/QIS components of a higher level threshold.
5.7 Evaluation
To demonstrate the operation of this approach we constructed a prototype system focus-
ing on the local processing submission components. To achieve this, the prototype system
generates a set of clients each with randomized demographics, measures, location and time
records, and in the case of this evaluation 100,000 clients were generated. These clients
then process a set of data submission requests which are submitted to the prototype server
and evaluated for privacy considerations.
The prototype evaluation used population distributions from the Greater Sydney Metropoli-
tan area to generate the individual client’s demographics including: age, gender, ethnicity,
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income and education. The prototype client and server were both developed in Java (1.6),
the client uses SQLITE for its data storage and the server uses Microsoft SQL Server Enter-
prise Edition for its data storage.
The evaluation measures the approach’s effectiveness at specific privacy levels in the
following areas:
• Reduction of potentially re-identifiable unique demographic combinations.
• The proportion of submissions that met maximum submission detail including all
optional dimensions.
• The proportion of dimensions/measures not submitted or submitted at a diminished
precision.
The submission rule approach, allows for a great deal of specification in the types of
flexibility the client has available, to adjust the data before submission. To demonstrate
this our test submission includes all identified data components, including five demographic
dimensions, three measure dimensions, temporal dimension and a location dimension using
location type classification.
Thresholds are set for each of the data components, then executed on the local device
based on the specific dataset. The dimensions are grouped into mandatory and optional
components of the submission. As such, two demographic, one measure, temporal at lowest
resolution and location (min level of granularity) dimensions are set as mandatory. A further
three demographics, two measures, temporal at highest resolution and location (max level
of granularity) dimensions are set as optional.
5.7.1 Results
Our approach to local processing for re-identification protection, is based on the premise
of a trade-off between the amount of individually specific data requested and the level of
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Fig. 5.4 Demographics Removal and Impact on k-anonymity Value
submission and privacy thresholds a system will have. As such, a comparison against the
more typical approach is relevant. In a more typical case, rather than making the decision
on the local device, the number of demographics required would be adjusted at a system-
wide level. As such, the reduction of the number of demographics reduces the overall
unique combinations and hence the chance of re-identification. The results of this type of
approach, for a sample of 100,000 submissions are displayed in Figure 5.4 where there is a
clear benefit of decreasing the number of demographics required for submission if keeping
a low k-anonymity value is a priority.
However, in a more adaptive approach, such as using local processing to make decisions
based on greater knowledge of potential re-identification, this can be improved by only
removing demographic combinations at higher risk of re-identification due to lower repre-
sentation and therefore k-anonymity values. In our approach, this is evaluated based on a
set threshold and the individual’s demographic probability, based on population averages.
In Figure 5.5 we show how this approach on the same underlying data can support having
132 Privacy Threshold Approach to HPSN Data Aggregation and Collection
Fig. 5.5 Local Processing Impact of k-anonymity Value
greater demographic requests in a data submission while alleviating privacy risk.
As figure 5.5 demonstrates, the local processing approach provided a steep decline in
the number of distinct demographic combinations that had a k value lower than x. In fact,
for the most critical level of k value, which is 5, a suitable k-anonymity level was reached at
4 demographics (for which only 3 distinct demographic combinations had k < 5), while the
approach in Figure 5.4 required reduction to 2 for a comparable k-anonymity value. That is,
in Figure 5.4, 4 demographics included led to 23 distinct demographic combinations with k
<5, 3 demographics included led to 13 combinations with k<5, and only with 2 demograph-
ics included was there 0 combinations with k<5. The number of demographics included
in a submission, relate to the demographic threshold and overall threshold limits, where a
lower threshold would result in a limitation of the number of demographics or the detail of
a demographic. Alternatively, the number of demographics with low k value could also be
decreased by increasing the overall number of submissions, however, this is somewhat out-
5.7 Evaluation 133
Fig. 5.6 Comparison of Adjusted and Complete Demographic Combinations
side the control of the system. This assumption could be taken into account in our threshold
approach to provide lower thresholds, where larger numbers of submissions are expected to
provide further improvements over a system level demographic setting approach.
In Figure 5.6 we compare the number of demographic combinations that are adjusted
by excluding one or more optional demographics to the number of complete demographic
combinations. As shown, our implementation returned the majority of demographics com-
binations in a complete manner, at the varying threshold levels. Additionally, as it is the
least represented demographic groups in terms of population numbers that were adjusted, a
larger majority of overall submissions were complete (59%).
Our analysis of the use of location and temporal components in data submissions con-
siders that in many cases location types or very coarse locations and broad time periods
will not be sensitive for re-identification purposes (see Privacy section). However, even if
utilized for such a purpose, it could be mitigated by a threshold approach and we can look
at this in terms of a similar k-anonymity analysis. In Figure 5.7, we display the k-anonymity
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Fig. 5.7 Local Processing Impact of k-anonymity Value with Location Types
values for a mix of a location dimension and multiple demographic dimensions, which has
a typical graph as the number of demographics are decreased. To keep the location type
dimension from further creating low k value distinct dimension combinations, our threshold
approach took the n (where n is a randomized variable 4 < n < 10) most common locations
types for each individual and submitted all other location types as undisclosed to the HPSS.
This is potentially a key consideration, as even with four demographics, the addition of the
location types we included would have extended the number of distinct dimension combi-
nations out to a possible 22176, making it quite likely that almost all combinations would
have had a k-value lower than 5.
Overall, the threshold approaches and local processing modification of public health rel-
evant data collection as shown in these results can be effective in improving the k-anonymity
value of demographic groups and hence a reduction is potential re-identification and mis-
use of collected data. In terms of demographics, the types of demographics with less even
distributions create more modifications. The cost of this approach in terms of decreased
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information collection as compared to just excluding entire dimensions is also an improve-
ment. The approach could also be further improved through calibration of the HPSN over
time.
5.8 Discussion and Future Work
Systems that collect public health related data have significant implications in terms of pri-
vacy, anonymity, ethical considerations and technical challenges that need to be considered
in development of a public health information systems approach.
The on-going development of participatory sensing technologies and the greater under-
standing of participant values and requirements of systems gathered from early adopters will
continue to influence and extend the types of participatory sensing possible and its potential
in the health context. Of significance to health participatory sensing is the development of
new and advanced sensors that continue to extend the range of what can be sensed and de-
tected [30]. Additionally, the growth in smart device ownership and personal health tracking
and quantification will continue to drive the potential of health participatory sensing.
The proposed smartphone-based public health information system focuses on alleviating
privacy issues that would be inherent in developing public health data collection capabili-
ties from participatory sensing and personalized intervention platforms. As such, the system
would be quite resilient to extension via new sensors or sensor systems as they would present
just an additional data measure, where the key privacy restrictions are demographic, tempo-
ral and spatial-based. However, the extension of sensor capabilities potentially may reach
the point where sensor systems are diagnostic in nature, which would result in the mea-
sure itself being of a sensitive nature, in a manner similar to portions of a private electronic
health record. These considerations could potentially also be resolved within the bounds of
the existing described approach.
However, privacy and public perceptions of such participatory sensing approaches need
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to be further researched. As such, future work could include studies of perceived privacy of
participatory sensing applications specific to the health domain. A useful extension in this
regard would be to consider incentivization, adoption and health organization acceptance of
such approaches.
5.9 Conclusion
This chapter describes smartphone-based public health information systems for population-
scale anonymous capture of public health data and intervention. The type of system de-
scribed also has the new and powerful capability that data requests and public health inter-
ventions can be distributed, performed and evaluated without the need for identifying details
of an individual participant to ever leave their mobile device. Additionally we have consid-
ered the privacy, anonymity and intervention properties and implications of such systems.
The smartphone-based public health information systems include an approach based on
local processing to aggregate data for public health use that utilizes privacy thresholds and
an adaptable approach to data submission that supports the data collection model for HPSNs,
utilized for the purpose of public health data collection and interventions. To this end, we
included an approach to submission rules/health intervention rules that allows a compromise
between individual privacy and public health application requirements and an algorithmic
approach to computing QIS to compare to threshold privacy values. We provided a detailed
evaluation of the privacy preserving characteristics of such systems at the level of large user
numbers.
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6 TARGETED AND ANONYMIZED HPSN PUBLIC HEALTH
INTERVENTIONS
Preamble
This chapter is based on a conference paper, that was published in the Annual International
Conference of the Engineering in Medicine and Biology Society (EMBC) [1]. It has been
included as a chapter of this thesis with only minor formatting changes to align with the
thesis format.
This chapter forms the final chapter of the implementation/evaluation section. The pro-
ceeding chapters 4 and 5 dealt with the distribution of data collection policies and the de-
identification of data before submission. This final chapter deals specifically with the distri-
bution, application and reporting collection of the use of public health interventions within a
health participatory sensing network. Though these topics were touched on briefly in chap-
ters 4 and 5, they are covered in greater detail in this section with an appropriate prototype
implementation and results. Additionally, much of the methodology for this final chapter
was already introduced in previous chapters, and as such, references to previous papers
(including papers used as chapters in this thesis) are used extensively in this chapter.
This chapter relates back to subsection 3.3.4 in the initial foundation chapter and ex-
pands and details the approach utilized.

ABSTRACT
Public health interventions, comprising information dissemination to affect behavioral ad-
justment, have long been a significant component of public health campaigns. However,
there has been limited development of public health intervention systems to make use of
advances in mobile computing and telecommunications technologies. Such developments
pose significant challenges to privacy and security where potentially sensitive data may be
collected. In our previous work, we identified and demonstrated the feasibility of using
mobile devices as anonymous public health data collection devices as part of a Health Par-
ticipatory Sensing Network (HPSN). An advanced capability of these networks extended in
this chapter, would be the ability to distribute, apply, report on and analyze the usage and
effectiveness of targeted public health interventions in an anonymous way. In this chapter
we describe such a platform, its place in the HPSN and demonstrate its feasibility through
an implementation.
6.1 Introduction
The use of information and behavioral adjustment type public health interventions has large
potential to evolve into a more targeted, measurable form of public health intervention
through the use of new communications and mobile computing platforms. Advantages
include the collection of real-time or near real-time data on the effectiveness of public
health interventions, effective long-term measurement of benefits and more precise tar-
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geting. Additionally, health participatory sensing systems such as HPSNs [2] allow for
potential population-wide data capture, the ability to more rapidly change an interven-
tion/collection approach and reduction of some of the biases associated with survey-based
methodologies.
HPSNs differ from other health communication systems such as interconnected EHR
and PHRs [3] which deal with identified individuals and their personal health data and
possible communication such as appointment reminders or medication adherence. Instead,
HPSN focus on collecting data that is non-identifying, and is used for overall population
measurements and behavioral or informational public health communication rather than
individual specific medical communication.
However, such advances pose their own significant privacy and security challenges that
need to be addressed. There are two key challenges to this type of public health intervention
platform. Firstly, as the specific intervention is by necessity decided on and applied at
the local device level, a large number of broader interventions need to be delivered to each
device efficiently. Secondly, is the need to report with as much detail as possible, as to which
intervention was performed and its effectiveness without breaching privacy, or inadvertently
allowing for individual re-identification at a later stage.
We propose a solution to these problems; which is an extension and combination of
our prior work in relation to HPSNs [2, 4] and query assurance [5]. The query assurance
architecture is adapted to reduce the quantity of health interventions that need to be delivered
to participants and hence the resultant computation load on the devices. The HPSN approach
is used as the data collection and distribution framework for public health interventions, as
the interventions are distributed, applied, and the outcomes collected and analyzed within
the existing capabilities of the HPSN framework.
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6.2 Related Work
The rich capabilities of participatory sensing have garnered interest in its usage for a range
of quite disparate areas. This includes air quality and pollution sensing [6], urban area noise
level data collection [7] and public health data collection [2] amongst many others. This
has in turn spurred a number of different approaches to resolving or decreasing the implicit
security and privacy concerns when involving individuals in sensing/data collection. The
more conventional approach would be to use a trusted server, then k-anonymity [8] or a
variant, to anonymize the data before it is accessible for research/analysis. The main down-
side of this type of approach is the need for a fully trusted server, which creates a single
point of failure in terms of privacy breaches. Alternatively, other approaches have improved
on this by removing some sensitive information before submission (removal of identifiers
and communications anonymity) with a central point of trust [9] to provide an anonymous
approach. While this is quite effective when the participatory sensing network is collecting
data on something not specific to the individual, this alone is not well-suited to a model
where information on the participant is a key submission component (such as in the case
of collection of public health intervention data) as de-identification protection is still imple-
mented at a central trusted point. There has been some prior research to resolve the issue of
requiring a fully trusted server, such as, decentralized participatory sensing networks [10]
using user interaction/awareness as part of the approach or keeping the data managed by
the participant [11, 12] and stringent user-definable access control mechanisms to manage
sharing. The limitation of these approaches when considering HPSNs is that typically they
have not incorporated support for public health interventions (or an equivalent), a capability
that does not have a direct parallel in most participatory sensing systems and remains an
important component of HPSNs.
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6.3 Participatory Sensing for Public Health
The growth in the potential for participatory sensing has been greatly increased through the
high levels of smartphone adoption in many countries [13] and proliferation of commer-
cial wearable devices and health sensors, leading to the pervasive availability of powerful
sensing platforms that are highly human-centric, making them ideal as the center-points for
health participatory sensing models.
In our previous work [2] we identified a number of different classifications for partici-
pation in a HPSN. The classification most relevant to public health interventions is ‘active
participatory sensing’. Active participatory sensing differs from other types of participa-
tory sensing by providing inputs to the individual to alter the actions they would have taken
whilst participating in the HPSN. Active participatory sensing in the health context has a
somewhat different goal to that of many other active participatory sensing contexts [14].
While an active participatory model for typical sensing might focus on affecting individ-
uals to collect a more complete data set in terms of spatial/temporal range, health and
epidemiological-related active participatory sensing would be more concerned with affect-
ing a health-related action and hence have a component equating to a public health inter-
vention. As such, the behavior change would be to firstly attempt to improve the sensing
data captured in terms of risk and preventative factors. Additionally for public health goals,
this allows for immediate and continuous feedback on the effectiveness of interventions on
receiving groups. It is assumed that active participatory sensing would have similar levels
of technical sensor capabilities to other classifications [2], with the focus shifted to the po-
tential two-way communication that can be built on sensing data and an inherent feedback
loop. This has the potential to be both a powerful data collection tool as well as a novel
public health intervention platform. Its potential scope includes the ability, in a timely and
accurate manner, to quantify precisely the effectiveness of public health interventions.
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Fig. 6.1 Public Health Information System Architecture (see section 5.4)
6.4 Public Health Intervention Platform
As a necessity, an anonymous public health intervention platform will need to be incorpo-
rated into a larger system which provides for public health data collection. This is because
without such a larger capability, the effectiveness of the utilized public health interventions
could not be collected and analyzed in a timely manner. Even without this public health
data collection system, the intervention approach can still provide a lesser but still signif-
icant improvement over traditional public health information/behavioral interventions. As
such, we consider that public health interventions can be conducted as a component of a
HPSN as described in section 6.3 and our previous work [2].
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The platform components and their inter-relationships are illustrated in Fig 6.1, and
serve to support the capabilities of anonymous distribution, local application of public health
interventions, data collection for reporting, and analysis of results. These are described in
further detail in the following subsections.
6.4.1 Distribution
The distribution of public health interventions in the HPSN comprises of two main compo-
nents, the distribution network and the distribution approach.
The distribution network consists of a mix network [15] or onion network [16], which
provides for anonymity of the submitter as well as secure communication. Such approaches
utilize a chain of proxy servers between the participant and HPSN, which can provide
anonymity for both parties, though in this case it is only required for the mobile device
user. Though this creates additional implementation complexity, the potential benefit to
real privacy is significant, with the only remaining significant privacy threats being: inse-
cure storage of data on the local device which we consider outside the HPSN network; and
re-identification via the content of the data submitted discussed below.
The distribution approach, utilizes our previous query assurance approach [5] to provide
granular completeness, correctness and freshness assurance of the public health interven-
tions that are distributed to the HPSN clients. This approach uses an implementation of
one or many sorted and digitally signed merkle hash tree/s utilizing expiring timestamps,
retrieved alongside the requested data to verify the content of the retrieved data. This al-
lows for a hash of each possible granule of retrieved data, to be efficiently distributed with a
single digital signature and expiring timestamp for the overall request, reducing verification
overhead of both computation time and data. This is effective even where only subsets of
the overall data are retrieved through a third party or untrusted distributed network. This
allows for high levels of certainty of the validity of data, while allowing for flexibility in
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request size even though the data is distributed through untrusted nodes, as well as keeping
verification data overhead size and processing time to acceptable levels.
6.4.2 Application
As public health interventions are performed on the local device, the decision as to the
intervention to perform, must also be made locally, as more specific information about the
individual is not transmitted to the HPSN server. As such, the specific intervention is chosen
locally, to most closely match the individual’s demographic and health profile details, even
if those details cannot be fully disclosed to the server.
6.4.3 Reporting Collection
To provide an anonymous public health intervention system that also collects outcomes
and the effectiveness of those executed interventions, a level of data collection is a neces-
sity. However, if the necessary limitations on data collection are not considered, this could
result, even in cases where de-identification of data is performed locally, in unwanted re-
identification of data at a later stage using data external to the HPSN [4]. This potential
scenario is a significant concern of HPSNs and by extension public health interventions sys-
tems on such networks. We consider that the most effective way to mitigate this risk that
doesn’t require a trusted server or aggregation in some form, is the use of local processing
of data reporting at a suitably conservative privacy setting to minimize risks.
As such our system, by applying granular and modular restrictions upon data report-
ing [4], reduces real privacy risks through a threshold approach to privacy and submis-
sions. The local processing approach, considers the potential for re-identification before
submission and reduces or modifies the number or detail of the demographics submitted.
Additionally, the use of a local processing approach to data submission and health interven-
tions policies allows the on-device adaptation to achieve a data submission which matches
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the reporting request as closely as possible without breaching variable user defined privacy
conditions [4].
For public health interventions, this is resolved by submitting aggregate data that is not
time or location sensitive, with restrictions on the specificity of the intervention reported to
be performed. That is, for example, if an intervention was targeted at the entire population,
a certain level of demographic detail could be returned, as well as the intervention type
and the effectiveness of the intervention as a measure, such as any measurable change in
behavior or health indicators. Alternatively, if the intervention was tightly focused on a
small subset of the community, the specific intervention type may need to be reported as a
broader type that is inclusive of the specific type and limited additional demographic details
as prioritized by the intervention request.
6.4.4 Analysis
The analysis of public health participatory sensing data relies on collection of sufficient
data for public health uses [17], which differs from what would be required in most other
participatory sensing systems. As such, generally aggregate non-specific demographic level
data is needed, as well as the measured values and the types of interventions performed.
6.5 Implementation and Results
Our implementation provides an approach that addresses the key challenges of efficient
public health intervention distribution and the reporting of the application and effectiveness
of public health interventions.
Public health interventions are likely to include a combination of text, images, video
and audio components. Additionally, even when considering only broad demographics tar-
gets, this can result in potentially tens of thousands of different combinations for targeted
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interventions, when extending this to specific data about the individual stored at the mobile
device level and multiple public health groups/organizations involved in the system. While
much of this overhead could be reduced through conditional approaches which make a sin-
gle intervention relevant to multiple targets, the core problem remains. As such, we created
an example data set that includes different data types and compares the data overhead of
retrieving the entire data set, to retrieving a subset and a verification tree for data quality
assurance and our previous approach that utilizes a more efficient verification tree [5].
The data setup involved 2000 components typical of an audio/visual intervention size
and 10000 components of a text and intervention details size. These components were veri-
fied by a single verification tree [5] (see Section 6.4.1). Even with this limited size dataset,
it is apparent that it wouldn’t be feasible to distribute the entirety of the interventions to
any particular user, as this would represent hundreds of megabytes. Our proposed approach
instead involves a user requesting a subset (approximately 8-10 megabytes). The request
is broad enough that it does not expose any personally identifiable details, the participant
device then uses the verification tree to authenticate the subset. This removes the need for
direct communication with the source, or for the source to hash and digitally sign every
possible requested combination.
An additional component of our approach is optimization of the verification tree based
on historic usage [5]. As such, we perform our implementation pre and post optimization
incorporating 5000 requests for each. The results of the verification overhead are displayed
in figure 6.2.
The reporting of the application of public health interventions can raise some issues re-
lating to the potential for re-identification of the individual through their submission. As
such, to address this issue we utilize our previous approach for public health data collec-
tion [4], extended and modified for public health interventions, which uses a threshold and
priority approach to decide what information is reported for analysis before locally pro-
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Fig. 6.2 Public Health Intervention Distribution Verification Overhead
cessing the result and submitting through an anonymous communications network [4] (see
Section 6.4.3 for details). The implementation involves applying specific example public
health interventions at the client levels, utilizing the privacy threshold approach to process
the data for submission. This is followed by analysis of the submissions for their potential
re-identification risk as a k-anonymity value and compared to the number of example inter-
ventions that were returned with less specific detail (for example with fewer demographic
details).
To demonstrate the operation of this approach, we constructed a prototype that cre-
ates a set of clients, each with randomized demographics, interventions, location and time
records. These clients then process a set of 100000 reporting submission requests which are
submitted to the prototype server and evaluated for privacy considerations. The prototype
evaluation used population distributions from the Greater Sydney Metropolitan [18] area to
generate the individual client’s demographics including age, gender, ethnicity, income and
education. The prototype client and server are both developed in Java (1.6), the client uses
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Fig. 6.3 Public Health Intervention Distinct Demographic Combinations to Low k Value
Combinations
SQLITE for its data storage and the server uses Microsoft SQL Server Enterprise Edition
for its data storage.
The results of the evaluation are displayed in Figure 6.3, whereby the number of distinct
demographic combinations that were collected and hence of possible use for re-identification
are contrasted against the number of distinct combinations with a low k anonymity value if
local processing modification did not occur. We contrast this to the number of modifica-
tions our approach made at a local processing level to decrease low k value occurrences
to nil. In our implementation results, it is apparent that even with a quite high number of
distinct combinations, it is only a small percentage that needs to be modified/changed to
improve privacy, typically in the range of 1-2%, though as this is achieved through a local
processing approach a safety buffer is necessary. In the case of our implementation, be-
tween 3-5% of distinct combinations were modified to remove low k value combinations.
This demonstrates two components of our approach, firstly that it is possible to retrieve pub-
lic health interventions based on demographic grouping to reduce the overall data retrieval
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requirement without a significant risk of re-identification, and secondly that with minor lo-
cal processing modification or partially reducing demographics based on local processing
as implemented in our approach, quite detailed public health intervention feedback can be
provided without a privacy risk.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter describes the public health intervention capabilities of a smartphone-based par-
ticipatory sensing system for population-scale public health data capture and intervention.
In particular, we describe the new and powerful capability that public health interventions
can be distributed, performed and evaluated without the need for identifying details of an in-
dividual participant to ever leave their mobile device. Additionally, we have considered the
efficiency, privacy and anonymity of the intervention capabilities. The smartphone-based
public health information systems include an approach based on local processing to aggre-
gate data for public health via utilization of privacy thresholds and an adaptable approach
to public health interventions and reporting. To this end we provided a detailed evaluation
of the privacy preserving characteristics of such intervention systems, and an analysis of the
overheads and efficiency of the public health intervention distribution model.
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7 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Systems that collect public health related data have significant implications in terms of pri-
vacy, anonymity, ethical considerations and technical challenges that need to be considered
in development of a public health information systems approach.
However, HPSNs show great promise in their capability for both collecting relevant,
timely and useful public health information that makes the implications well worth investi-
gating with the development of strategies and approaches to mitigating the negative impli-
cations will be key to potential usage.
The use of mobile device technology for public health data collection and intervention
is largely still in its infancy, as such, the on-going development of new sensing technologies
and experience with usage will continue to influence the types of participatory sensing pos-
sible and the potential in the public health context. These collection and intervention related
requirements are introduced in Chapter 3 and the discussion and future work of this work in
presented in Section 7.2 below.
This thesis focused on some of the technical and privacy issues related to the distribu-
tion of collection rules and interventions, collection of data and intervention results and the
submission of data. Additionally, it also dealt with efficiencies of distribution and a multi-
data owner system. Finally, as this was a largely undefined area of participatory sensing, a
certain amount of classification and description of interaction and capabilities was required.
The distribution component provided a suitable approach for distribution of data collec-
tion policies and public health interventions. This was the most explored area in previous
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work with many alternate approaches available with the contribution of this thesis focus-
ing on gaining some additional efficiencies through routine maintenance of the verification
objects to reduce security overhead. The second requirement was that the approach had
to be compatible with a multiple data-owner environment which is addressed in the imple-
mentation. The implementation was used to evaluate the efficiencies of the query assurance
approach and provided some improvements over prior work. These distribution related re-
quirements are introduced in Chapter 4 and the discussion and future work of this work in
presented in Section 7.1 below.
7.1 Query Assurance
There is a trend towards development of more complex and integrated future public health
information systems, with data held between multiple organizations and even potentially
components held with the consumer [6]. The query assurance and distribution approaches
described in this thesis aim to specifically target the issues of public health data stored over
a distributed architecture with multiple data owners, such as a HPSN. In Chapter 4 we
proposed a query assurance method matched to this challenge, as the approach primarily
provides query assurance even in cases where the data is stored on hardware not controlled
by the data owner and secondarily provides encryption as part of the approach.
The types of data likely to be stored in public health databases by health organizations
and providers are more fully understood and of a traditional nature, leading to a level of
certainty as to what will tend to be stored in the foreseeable future. However, the types of
data collected by health consumers are developing rapidly and it is not inconceivable that
they may be the larger data sources in future health information systems.
This would include the collection of subjective data, as well as increasingly objective
data collected by consumer grade mobile sensors [6] and other consumer health commu-
nications technologies [7]. A recent report suggested that one in four adult Internet users
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track their own health data online [8], suggesting the possible growing importance of this
source of public health data. The types of data collected already are potentially important
for consideration of risk and preventative health factors when taken in combination with the
individual’s complete health record. The proliferation of personal fitness data systems may,
in many cases lead to the storage of such data in separate or proprietary repositories, as
is seen in current practice. This anticipates future health information system architectures
where some parts of health data, for example, some of the arguably less sensitive data such
as fitness data, are held within different proprietary repositories, but public health groups
are still able to reliably integrate and access this data as if it is a single record. This is an
important functionality for realizing computational health capabilities, such as data mining
to support individual care, and population health analysis [6]. The numerous organizations
holding public health-related data and the lack of complete trust between these organiza-
tions, underscores the need for a generic query assurance approach, extensible to multiple
repositories, owners and data types as described in this chapter. The query assurance tech-
niques described can be applied to repositories of health or fitness data collected by mobile
or pervasive sensors.
In summary, emerging health information systems have great potential in the realm of
more complete data and communications capabilities, but will have to address the chal-
lenges of such systems, including the greater challenges to query assurance and security. As
such, we consider the following would be important to further development of secure query
assurance over encrypted public health information:
Combining more complex forms of searchable encryption with query assurance could
be attempted, with the goal to increase query efficiency or allow more complex queries to
be performed against the encrypted data set.
In another research path, possible improvements to the initialization and maintenance
portion of the approach could be considered. Further, extension of this implementation to
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provide secure auditing would be a useful approach.
7.2 Public health data collection and intervention
The threshold approach to de-identification of individual data aimed to meet two goals.
Firstly, fill the existing gap in the prior work by providing a suitable low overhead approach
that removes the need for a trusted third party, and secondly, provide an approach more
suitable to public health data - the types of data collected likely to be very dissimilar to other
participatory sensing applications where location is a key component. Hence the existing
privacy approaches have limited utility when applied to the public health context. The
evaluation of the approach indicated that while it is not a zero-risk system, privacy risks
can be significantly reduced through minor reductions of the detail of data submitted in line
with local threshold limits and demographic and distribution analysis.
Lastly, an implementation of the key new functionality of HPSNs over traditional public
health data collection methodologies was provided, that is, the capability to utilize public
health interventions on the same platform. The distribution and reporting threshold limita-
tions of these interventions was evaluated, providing a key initial work in this area.
The proposed smartphone-based public health information system focuses on alleviating
privacy issues that would be inherent in developing public health data collection capabili-
ties from participatory sensing and personalized intervention platforms. As such, the system
would be quite resilient to extension via new sensors or sensor systems as they would present
just an additional data measure, where the key privacy restrictions are demographic, tempo-
ral and spatial-based. However, the extension of sensor capabilities potentially may reach
the point where sensor systems are diagnostic in nature which would result in the measure
itself being of a sensitive nature, in a similar manner to portions of a private electronic
health record. These considerations could potentially also be resolved within the bounds of
the existing described approach.
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However, privacy and public perceptions of such participatory sensing approaches need
to be further researched. As such, future work could include studies of perceived privacy of
participatory sensing applications specific to the health domain. A useful extension in this
regard would be to consider incentivization, adoption and health organization acceptance of
such approaches.

8 CONCLUSIONS
This thesis describes Health Participatory Sensing Networks, their capabilities, challenges
and technical requirements for public health data collection and intervention. Specifically,
this thesis defined the capabilities, interaction types and incentivization approaches for these
participatory systems.
Further, this work provided technical detail and prototype implementations and evalua-
tions of some of the key challenges of HPSNs. Namely, the distribution of HPSN data, the
anonymous collection of public health data and the usage of public health interventions.
The smartphone-based public health information systems include an approach based on
local processing of aggregate data for public health use that utilizes privacy thresholds and
an adaptable approach to data submission that supports the data collection model for HPSNs,
utilized for the purpose of public health data collection and interventions. To this end,
this thesis included an approach to submission rules/health intervention rules that allows a
compromise between individual privacy and public health application requirements and an
algorithmic approach to computing QIS to compare to threshold privacy values. Further, a
detailed evaluation of the privacy preserving characteristics of such systems at the level of
large user numbers was provided.
The evaluation of each section found that privacy and security could be substantially
improved with minor overheads and data restrictions.
Future work providing a much deeper analysis of incentivization approaches for this
specific participatory sensing model could be beneficial. Additionally, the further evaluation
168 Conclusions
of this approach utilizing different demographic data to check or additionally fine tune the
privacy thresholds could improve the overall privacy for individuals.
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A IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS AND PSEUDOCODE
A.1 Query Assurance Algorithms
Algorithm 1 DB Initialization
1: Read data from file
2: Send data to DB server
3: while hash depth not reached do
4: Hash element
5: Send to Path tree on verification server
6: Re-sign root node
7: if index required then
8: Send index to Index tree on verification server
9: Re-sign index tree
10: end if
11: end while
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Algorithm 2 Client driven data accessing
1: query database
2: query Verification server
3: receive query result
4: receive verification object
5: hash query result
6: if hash (query result) exists in verification object then
7: while signature not reached do
8: hash (lowerHash)
9: end while
10: verify signature with highest level hash
11: if verification passes then
12: query result is valid
13: elsequery result is invalid
14: end if
15: end if
Algorithm 3 Server driven Data accessing
1: query database
2: Server translates query to verification Tree
3: receive query result + verification object
4: hash (query result + path)
5: if hash exists in verification object then
6: while while signature not reached do
7: hash(lowerHash)
8: end while
9: verify signature with highest level hash
10: if verification passes then
11: query result is valid
12: elsequery result is invalid
13: end if
14: end if
Algorithm 4 Refreshing verification tree time stamps
1: Server maintains list of timestamped nodes
2: Server sends time stamps nodes to Data Owner
3: Data owner verifies signatures+ time stamp authenticity
4: Data owner resign the nodes and returns to Server
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Algorithm 5 Maintenance
1: for i = 0 to indexNo do
2: leaf = firstLeaf
3: for j = 0 to leafCount do
4: if leaf.readCount > threshold then
5: temp = leaf
6: while nextLeaf.readCount > threshold do
7: leaf = nextLeaf
8: end while
9: end if
10: if temp ! = null then
11: find common ancestor(temp,leaf)
12: apply time stamp + signature to ancestor
13: temp = null
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
17: for j = 0 to pathTreeNo do
18: check readRecords
19: if readRecords > granThreshold then
20: re-hash data to finer granularity
21: end if
22: set time stamp duration based on modIficationRate
23: end for
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A.2 Local Processing Algorithms
Algorithm 6 Test Implementation
1: for j = 0 to 10000 do
2: Mobile Device Individual Init()
3: Mobile Device Local Processing()
4: end for
Algorithm 7 Mobile Device Database Clear
1: Drop Table Demographic
2: Drop Table Individual
3: Drop Table IndividualToDemographic
4: Drop Table Measure
5: Drop Table Location
6: Drop Table Location_Type
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Algorithm 8 Mobile Device Database Init
1: Mobile Device Database Clear()
2: Create Table Demographic
3: Create Table Individual
4: Create Table IndividualToDemographic
5: Create Measure Table Measure
6: Create Table Location
7: Create Table Location_Type
8: Insert Greater Sydney area ancestry data into Demographics Table (Demographic_ID,
Description, Type_ID, Probability)
9: Insert Greater Sydney area age group data into Demographics Table (Demographic_ID,
Description, Type_ID, Probability)
10: Insert Greater Sydney area gender data into Demographics Table (Demographic_ID,
Description, Type_ID, Probability)
11: Insert Greater Sydney area income group data into Demographics Table (Demo-
graphic_ID, Description, Type_ID, Probability)
12: Insert Greater Sydney area education level data into Demographics Table (Demo-
graphic_ID, Description, Type_ID, Probability)
13: Insert location type data into Location_Type Table (Location_Type_ID, Description,
Probability)
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Algorithm 9 Mobile Device Individual Init
1: Generate random ancestry, age group, gender, income group and education level.
2: Insert ancestry into IndividualToDemographic Table
3: Insert age group into IndividualToDemographic Table
4: Insert gender into IndividualToDemographic Table
5: Insert income group into IndividualToDemographic Table
6: Insert education level into IndividualToDemographic Table
7: Randomize number of workouts x
8: for j = 0 to x do
9: Generate randomized location_type
10: Generate randomized latitude
11: Generate randomized longitude
12: Generate randomized measure/s
13: Generate randomized datetime
14: Insert lat, long and location_type into Location Table
15: Insert individualID, measure_type, value, description, time, locationID into Mea-
sure Table
16: end for
A.2 Local Processing Algorithms 177
Algorithm 10 Mobile Device Local Processing
1: Set Overall Threshold
2: Set Demographic Threshold
3: Set Temporal Threshold
4: Set Measure Threshold
5: Retrieve data request
6: Set optionalDemographics
7: Set optionalNoLocations
8: Set optionalMeasures
9: Set mandatoryDemographics
10: Set mandatoryNoLocations
11: Set mandatoryNoMeasures
12: Set mandatoryTemporalDetail
13: Set datetime Period
14: Calculate OverallQIS for mandatory details
15: while OverallQIS < Overall Threshold and additional optional dimensions available do
16: add optional dimension
17: for each sub threshold do
18: if subQIS > sub threshold then
19: remove optional dimension
20: end if
21: end for
22: re-balance optional data based on available threshold.
23: end while
24: if OverallQIS < Overall Threshold then
25: Submit Aggreate Data
26: end if
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A.3 Local Processing Sample File
Sample data request rule:
<Submission_Rule>
<Name>PhyActDuration_Healthy_Bodies</Name>
<core_data>
<measure>Physical Activity Duration (Time)</measure>
<min_detail>HH</min_detail>
<max_detail>HH:MM:SS</max_detail>
<resolution_weighting>.65</resolution_weighting>
</core_data>
<optional_dimension>
<value>Start Time</value>
<min_detail>DD/MM/YYYY</min_detail>
<max_detail>DD/MM/YYYY HH:MM:SS</max_detail>
<resolution_weighting>.3</resolution_weighting>
<inclusion_weighting>.9</inclusion_weighting>
</optional_dimension>
<optional_dimension>
<value>Activity Type</value>
<min_detail>N/A</min_detail>
<max_detail>N/A</max_detail>
<resolution_weighting>N/A</resolution_weighting>
<inclusion_weighting>.7</inclusion_weighting>
</optional_dimension>
</Submission_Rule>
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A.4 Local Processing Results
# of Demographics
5 4 3 2
k value <
20
4555 947 507 92
k value <
10
1457 274 146 35
k value < 5 97 23 13 0
Distinct
Demo-
graphic
Combina-
tions
5952 1979 1275 208
Table A.1 Demographics Removal and Impact on k-anonymity Value
# of Demographics
5 4 3 2
k value <
20
2930 334 127 2
k value <
10
840 81 24 0
k value < 5 50 3 0 0
Distinct
Demo-
graphic
Combina-
tions
4668 1055 605 64
Table A.2 Local Processing Impact of k-anonymity value
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# of Demographics
5 4 3 2
Adjusted 2175 509 62 300
Complete 2493 546 64 305
Table A.3 Comparison of Adjusted and Complete Demographic Combination
# of Demographics
4 3 2
k
value
< 20
8276 136 36
k
value
< 10
6322 65 22
k
value
< 5
3443 40 11
Distinct
De-
mo-
graphic
Com-
bina-
tions
9048 832 418
Table A.4 Local Processing Impact of k-anonymity Value with Location Types
